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SEX-BASED BRAIN DIFFERENCES AND
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ABSTRACT
Technological advances have allowed neuroscientists to identify
brain differences between women and men, which may lead to
explanations for sex-biased population differences in behavior and
brain-based disorders. Although the research is at its early stages, this
is an appropriate time to examine some of the potential legal
implications of these findings. This Article examines that question in
the context of tort law, especially how scientific findings may affect the
use of the reasonable person standard in emotional injury claims.
Specifically, studies suggest that there may be distinct sex-based
mechanisms involved in reactions to extreme stress, raising the question
of whether women experience and process stress and trauma differently
than men.
This Article argues that these studies may eventually inform the use
of the reasonableness standard for freestanding emotional harm
claims. As science further develops, courts may either apply a
reasonable woman standard in limited contexts or at least allow jurors
to consider evidence of sex-based differences in applying a reasonable
person standard. Recognizing these differences, courts have already
begun to apply the reasonable woman standard to hostile workplace
environment claims, and science may support broader use of that
standard, especially for negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional harm claims.

INTRODUCTION
The last decades of legal development rightfully have broken
down artificial sex-based distinctions over a range of fronts—from
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employment to education and inheritance. We have Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg to thank for so much of these efforts. 1 But in recent
years, science has identified sex-based differences in brain structure
and function that may force the law to rethink its approach to sex
neutrality in some situations. This Article explores that problem in the
context of tort law.
Technological advances have allowed us to study the brain in new
ways, resulting in findings that indicate some subtle, but real,
differences in structure and function between male and female brains.
Neuroscientists have begun to examine these sex-based differences and
consider how they may aid in our understanding of brain physiology.
Naturally, this research has sparked debates in the scientific
community over a host of issues. 2 Some question the validity of the
findings entirely, expressing doubt over their central conclusions.
Other researchers conclude that the brain is a highly sex-influenced
organ. 3 Similarly, some research identifies “mosaics” of “femaletypical” features and “male-typical” features in individual brains.
Others claim that any documented differences are a result of—or
significantly influenced by—confounding factors like one’s
developmental environment. In short, no consensus exists. 4 Still, the
hope in pursuing this research is that it will lead to new avenues of
diagnosis and treatment for brain disorders, especially those disorders
that exhibit sex-biased differences in the incidence or nature of disease,
like migraines, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”),

1. See Robin West, Women in the Legal Academy: A Brief History of Feminist Legal
Theory, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 977, 982 (2018) (stating that Ruth Bader Ginsburg was “winning
lawsuits that would establish gender as something akin to a suspect class . . . and would soon
render all gender distinctions in federal and state law presumptively unconstitutional”).
2. See Daphna Joel & Cordelia Fine, Opinion, Can We Finally Stop Talking About ‘Male’
and ‘Female’ Brains?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/03/
opinion/male-female-brains-mosaic.html [https://perma.cc/JKQ4-6ANV]. The Barnard Center
for Research on Women devoted an entire issue to this research. See generally Rebecca JordanYoung, Giordana Grossi & Gina Rippon, Introduction: Fifty Shades of Grey Matter, SCHOLAR &
FEMINIST ONLINE: NEUROGENDERINGS (2019), http://sfonline.barnard.edu/neurogenderings/
introduction-fifty-shades-of-grey-matter [https://perma.cc/J6HW-FQPN] (introducing a series of
articles on scientific issues about sex, gender, and brains); GINA RIPPON, THE GENDERED BRAIN
(2019) (discussing the history of sex-difference research); see also Larry Cahill, Denying the
Neuroscience of Sex Differences, QUILLETTE (Mar. 29, 2019) [hereinafter Cahill, Denying the
Neuroscience],
https://quillette.com/2019/03/29/denying-the-neuroscience-of-sex-differences
[https://perma.cc/8FTQ-PVYV] (introducing the scientific debate on sex differences in brains and
arguing that differences do exist).
3. See Cahill, Denying the Neuroscience, supra note 2.
4. See Joel & Fine, supra note 2.
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and autism. 5 The fear is that this research will reinforce gender
stereotypes, bias, and discrimination, while also advancing arguments
of biological determinism. 6
Fears notwithstanding, research into sex-based brain differences
continues. Scientists have described accounting for sex as a biological
variable as “fundamental to rigorous, and relevant, biomedical
research.” 7 Consistent with this view, the National Institutes of Health
in 2016 implemented a policy that requires grant applicants to consider
“sex as a biological variable” in vertebrate animal and human studies. 8
Relatedly, scientists have begun to explore whether sex
differences in the brain may help explain some observed population
differences in cognition and behavior between men and women.
Scientists have documented sex-biased differences 9 in areas such as
emotion, memory, pain perception, facial identification, and
5. This line of research is an outgrowth of the movement toward precision-based therapies.
See Claudette Elise Brooks & Janine Austin Clayton, Sex/Gender Influences on the Nervous
System: Basic Steps Toward Clinical Progress, 95 J. NEUROSCI. RSCH. 14, 16 (2017); Jill B. Becker,
Michele L. McClellan & Beth Glover Reed, Sex Differences, Gender and Addiction, 95 J.
NEUROSCI. RSCH. 136, 143 (2017). This fundamental shift in research focus is reflected in the
themed issue of the Journal of Neuroscience Research, which is devoted entirely to the issue of
sex influences on the brain and nervous system functioning. See generally 95 J. NEUROSCI. RSCH.
1 (2017).
6. See Joel & Fine, supra note 2; see also Jordan-Young et al., supra note 2 (noting that
feminist language and histories “have been coopted to advance reductive and biologically
deterministic claims”).
7. Brooks & Clayton, supra note 5, at 14.
8. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, CONSIDERATION OF SEX AS A BIOLOGICAL VARIABLE IN
NIH-FUNDED RESEARCH (June 9, 2015), https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOTOD-15-102.html [https://perma.cc/FQC6-ZX8V]. This policy provoked various objections from
the field, including concern for how the policy might strengthen biases based on sex and gender
and could disregard feminist considerations on sex and gender in the fields of health and biology.
See Nur Zeynep Gungor, Annie Duchesne & Robyn Bluhm, A Conversation Around the
Integration of Sex and Gender When Modeling Aspects of Fear, Anxiety, and PTSD in Animals,
SCHOLAR & FEMINIST ONLINE: NEUROGENDERINGS (2019), http://sfonline.barnard.edu/
neurogenderings/a-conversation-around-the-integration-of-sex-and-gender-when-modelingaspects-of-fear-anxiety-and-ptsd-in-animals [https://perma.cc/3ACT-J7T4]; Heather ShattuckHeidorn & Sarah S. Richardson, Sex/Gender and the Biosocial Turn, SCHOLAR & FEMINIST
ONLINE: NEUROGENDERINGS (2019), http://sfonline.barnard.edu/neurogenderings/sex-genderand-the-biosocial-turn [https://perma.cc/SMA4-HLH5] (arguing that to require documentation of
sex differences in preclinical research would underplay the effects of gender as a biosocial
variable).
9. I use the term “sex-based” (or sexually dimorphic) to refer to physical traits of an
organism that are indicative of its biological sex and the term “sex-biased” to refer to traits,
patterns, or conditions exaggerated in one sex, but that can show varying degrees of overlap. See
Franck Mauvais-Jarvis, Arthur P. Arnold & Karen Reue, A Guide for the Design of Pre-Clinical
Studies on Sex Differences in Metabolism, 25 CELL METABOLISM 1216, 1216 (2017); Margaret M.
McCarthy et al., Sex Differences in the Brain: The Not So Inconvenient Truth, 32 J. NEUROSCI.
2241, 2241–42 (2012).
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visuospatial skills. 10 This line of research is also highly controversial.
For a long time, the neuroscience community largely attributed any
observed sex-associated population differences in cognition and
behavior to the effects of cultural and social factors. Some scientists
believe that sex-linked differences may contribute to, but do not
comprise all of, the numerous factors that account for behavioral
differences. 11 In light of the developing research on sex-based brain
differences, other scientists have begun to place more weight on
biological factors to explain variations in behavior and cognition. 12
This Article does not attempt to resolve these debates. Instead,
assuming that science teaches us that sex may affect certain brain
functions, disorders, and behaviors, this Article explores whether such
average differences should matter in law, particularly in tort law.
Courts must first decide whether to accept these studies as legally
admissible evidence. Assuming they do—a large assumption, given the
research is in its early stages and is surrounded by controversy—courts
10. See Larry Cahill, Why Sex Matters for Neuroscience, 7 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCI. 477,
*1 (2006) [hereinafter Cahill, Why Sex Matters] [https://perma.cc/3ZP6-B5NW]. But see Vanessa
Bentley et al., Improving Practices for Investigating Spatial “Stuff”: Part I: Critical Gender
Perspectives on Current Research Practices, SCHOLAR & FEMINIST ONLINE: NEUROGENDERINGS
(2019),
http://sfonline.barnard.edu/neurogenderings/improving-practices-for-investigatingspatial-stuff-part-i-critical-gender-perspectives-on-current-research-practices
[https://perma.cc/RRN5-82W9] (challenging findings of sex differences in spatial ability and
arguing that gender disparities cannot be explained by biological factors alone).
11. As some scholars have noted about this research,
[T]hese papers do not eschew the idea that sex-linked biology has effects on brain
development or functioning, but they do challenge the idea that sex or gender are
binary, fixed, unitary phenomena. They most especially challenge the idea that
‘neuroscience’ or ‘sex biology’ indicate that social formations related to gender and
sexuality proceed from something about structural or functional differences in our
brains.
Jordan-Young et al., supra note 2; see also Annelies Kleinherenbrink, Vanessa Bentley & Sigrid
Schmitz, Plasticity and Spatial Stuff Under Western Neoliberal Order, SCHOLAR & FEMINIST
ONLINE: NEUROGENDERINGS (2019), http://sfonline.barnard.edu/neurogenderings/plasticityand-spatial-stuff-under-western-neoliberal-order [https://perma.cc/5D9D-BHSR] (arguing that
“the brain should certainly be embraced as a valuable source of knowledge,” but also “recognizing
the role of contextual factors” that contribute to differences in neurological and behavioral
outcomes).
12. Research in this area does not support the gross generalization that there are “male”
brains and “female” brains or “male” natures and “female” natures. Jordan-Young et al., supra
note 2; see Katherine Bryant, Giordana Grossi & Anelis Kaiser, Feminist Interventions on the
Sex/Gender Question in Neuroimaging Research, SCHOLAR & FEMINIST ONLINE:
NEUROGENDERINGS (2019), http://sfonline.barnard.edu/neurogenderings/feminist-interventions
-on-the-sex-gender-question-in-neuroimaging-research [https://perma.cc/J47K-E82K] (noting
that the field is “fraught with interpretational problems” and arguing that scientists should eschew
dichotomization inherent in sex/gender research). Most scientists agree that “[b]rains and
behavior are the product of the combined, continuous interactions of innumerable causal
influences, that include, but go well beyond, sex-linked factors.” See Joel & Fine, supra note 2.
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must next decide whether society should recognize these sex-based
brain differences in legal and policy applications.
While the debate is ongoing about when these studies will be
ready for courtroom use, litigants will no doubt seek to introduce such
evidence in the near future. 13 They may do so in various legal settings,
but fundamentally, the legal system must confront whether it wants to
have a universal standard of behavior that applies neutrally in all
settings or whether it will recognize documented average differences
that may be relevant to perception and experience. 14 Because research
on sex-based brain differences continues, courts need to grapple with
its implications. This Article argues that when the scientific evidence
shows sex-based distinctions in emotional distress responses, it may
demand reconsideration of the reasonable person standard in the
emotional harm context.
Part I summarizes some relevant neuroscience and social science
research regarding sex-based brain differences pertaining to the search
for the physiological origins of emotional harm. The focus of this Part
is on research related to reactions to extreme stress, trauma, and the
storage of emotional memory, which may inform the elements of
certain torts involving emotional injury. Part II discusses the
reasonable person standard in tort law, which has been both lauded as
a neutral, objective standard, and criticized for failing to reflect
diversity of perspectives. Part III analyzes the potential use of
neuroscience research in the context of two freestanding tort claims
linked to experiences and reactions to emotional harm, negligent
infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) generally, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) specifically, in the context of
workplace harassment. Generally, the law eschews categorical
evidence, but Part III concludes that documentation of some sex-based
brain differences linked to average population differences in
perception and processing of emotional experiences could support the
use of sex-based standards of reasonableness in these limited contexts.

13. Litigants have begun to introduce neuroscience evidence in various areas of law. See
Francis X. Shen, Law and Neuroscience 2.0, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1043, 1048–49 (2016).
14. A word on vocabulary: As is commonly accepted, this Article refers to “sex” as a
biological concept and uses the term “gender” as a social construct. See Rebecca A. Nebel et al.,
Understanding the Impact of Sex and Gender in Alzheimer’s Disease: A Call to Action, 14
ALZHEIMER’S & DEMENTIA 1171, 1172 (2018); Becker et al., supra note 5, at 136. The issues
discussed in this Article may have potentially unique implications for transgender or intersex
individuals, but this is beyond the scope of this Article. The neuroscience studies on sex-based
brain differences are less developed with regard to transgender or intersex individuals; as the
science develops, further writings could explore this issue more fully. See infra note 24.
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Borrowing from the blended standard applied to children in negligence
cases, this approach would recognize certain average empirical
differences documented in science but avoid creating more room for
bias and discrimination. At the least, courts may allow jurors to
consider this evidence in applying a general reasonableness standard
to emotional harm claims.
Cautions
Before examining some of the research identifying sex-based
brain differences, a few words of caution are in order. 15 The brain is
proving to be a mix of sex-based similarities and differences at all levels
of its function. 16 Although neuroscience studies seek to identify
differences, they do not claim to suggest or assign value. 17 While the
studies recognize that there is a complicated interaction between
biological sex differences and environmental and sociocultural
factors, 18 they do not suggest that sex-based brain differences deprive
individuals of their agency. 19 Moreover, the studies observing sexbiased brain disorders, and sex-biased cognitive and behavioral

15. For an excellent overview of the challenges of interpreting the studies in this area, see
Cordelia Fine, Daphna Joel & Gina Rippon, Eight Things You Need To Know About Sex, Gender,
Brains, and Behavior: A Guide for Academics, Journalists, Parents, Gender Diversity Advocates,
Social Justice Warriors, Tweeters, Facebookers, and Everyone Else, SCHOLAR & FEMINIST
ONLINE: NEUROGENDERINGS (2019), http://sfonline.barnard.edu/neurogenderings/eight-thingsyou-need-to-know-about-sex-gender-brains-and-behavior-a-guide-for-academics-journalistsparents-gender-diversity-advocates-social-justice-warriors-tweeters-facebookers-and-ever
[https://perma.cc/63YA-ASUB].
16. Ruben C. Gur & Raquel E. Gur, Complementarity of Sex Differences in Brain and
Behavior: From Laterality to Multimodal Neuroimaging, 95 J. NEUROSCI. RSCH. 189, 189 (2017)
[hereinafter Gur & Gur, Complementarity].
17. See Larry Cahill, An Issue Whose Time Has Come, 95 J. NEUROSCI. RSCH. 12, 12 (2017)
(stating that many neuroscientists feared that in pursuing this research “establishing that males
and females are not the same in some aspect of brain function meant establishing that they were
not equal . . . [, an] assumption [that] is false and deeply harmful”).
18. See Becker et al., supra note 5, at 137, 142, 143. Some scientists have suggested that sex
differences may have roots in evolution. See Leonardo Christov-Moore et al., Empathy: Gender
Effects in Brain and Behavior, 46 NEUROSCI. & BIOBEHAV. REVS. 604, 604–06 (2014). Sex
differences in neurochemistry and hormonal levels have also been partially attributed to
evolution forces driving specific changes in animal behavior. See Shelley E. Taylor et al.,
Biobehavioral Responses to Stress in Females: Tend-and-Befriend, Not Fight-or-Flight, 107 PSYCH.
REV. 411, 411 (2000). Discussion of these results requires careful attention to and caution against
propagating neurosexism. Linda McClain, Nature, Culture, and Social Engineering: Reflections on
Evolution and Equality, in NOMOS: EVOLUTION AND MORALITY 347, 359, 365–66 (2012). One
danger of the essentialism line of thinking is that it fails to take into account neuroplasticity and
lifetime experiences. See Bentley et al., supra note 10.
19. See Becker et al., supra note 5, at 137.
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differences, denote population averages. 20 The research examines
average differences of a group of subjects as compared to another
group of subjects. There are always overlaps between the distributions
for male and female data studied. 21 In other words, women on average
may exhibit greater cognitive abilities in certain areas, but that does
not mean that men never demonstrate those same abilities. Similarly,
women may on average exhibit a greater susceptibility to certain
conditions or brain disorders, but that does not mean that men never
exhibit the same conditions or disorders. 22 Even if performance on
certain tasks is the same on average between men and women, there
may be sex-based differences in neural activities in completing the
task. 23
Further, numerous other issues require caution. 24 Perhaps most
significantly, it is critical to avoid “neurosexism”—giving into sexbased stereotypes, viewing differences as limitations, or failing to
recognize differences as cultural or social rather than biological—when

20. See Joel & Fine, supra note 2 (acknowledging that there are group-level differences in
brain and behavior and noting the important difference between group-level and individual-level
phenomena).
21. See Bryant et al., supra note 12 (“[F]eminist scientists have invited us to pay more
attention to intra-sex/gender variability and inter-sex/gender overlap, rather than using
sex/gender as a dichotomous variable . . . .”).
22. See Stuart J. Ritchie et al., Sex Differences in the Adult Human Brain: Evidence from
5216 UK Biobank Participants, 28 CEREBRAL CORTEX 2959, 2960 (2018).
23. Cahill, Why Sex Matters, supra note 10, at *2; see generally Bryant et al., supra note 12
(criticizing research in this field and calling for interventions such as “running empirical tests of
randomization control and permutation analyses to protect against false positives, calculating
measures of both difference . . . and overlap/similarity between groups, and reporting null
results”).
24. For example, the stereotype threat effect, in which stereotypes can affect behavior,
requires caution when reporting observed group differences. See Bentley et al., supra note 10.
Furthermore, our societal view of sex and gender is changing, and neuroscience research could
ultimately reject a binary paradigm of sex-based brain differences. See Becker et al., supra note
5, at 142; Nienke M. Nota et al., Brain Functional Connectivity Patterns in Children and
Adolescents with Gender Dysphoria: Sex-Atypical or Not?, 86 PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY
187, 187, 193–94 (2017). Slippery slope issues in law abound—for instance, we do not want to open
the door to allowing employers to use data on sex-based brain differences for privileging hiring
in a field. This would be reminiscent of debates of earlier generations surrounding hiring male
nurses or male flight attendants. See Leslie M. Kerns, A Feminist Perspective: Why Feminists
Should Give the Reasonable Woman Standard Another Chance, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 195,
200, 213–14, 219 (2001) (describing the evolution of the reasonable man standard to the
reasonable person standard, that ignores sex disparities in economic and professional status as a
result of women being pigeonholed into “feminized” labor sectors, which required little
professional education and provided for little mobility or pay).
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engaging in these topics. 25 Research in these areas is ever-changing,
and, as such, one should exercise humility when offering suggestions.
I. SELECTIVE FINDINGS OF SEX-BASED DIFFERENCES IN BRAIN
STRUCTURE, FUNCTION, AND BEHAVIOR
This Part highlights some developing research on sex-based
differences in brain structure, function, and behavior. While not
comprehensive, it selectively features some of the findings that might
implicate tort law, especially studies of sex-biased influences on
emotional memory, trauma, and stress effects. Those studies may have
important implications for the torts that are the focus of Part III: NIED
and IIED in the context of a hostile work environment. This Part is
necessarily a snapshot as the ongoing research is significant and
expanding all the time.
A. Sex-Based Differences in Brain Structure and Function
To begin to understand some of these studies, some definitional
categories are in order. Male and female brains can differ from each
other in several ways, and not all sex differences in the brain develop
or are expressed in the same way. 26 One widely accepted methodology
creates three categories of sex-based brain differences:
(1) Qualitative sex differences (or sexual dimorphism): sex
differences that cannot be measured on the same scale (for example,
features related to reproduction);
(2) Quantitative sex differences: average behavioral sex
differences for which the neural mechanisms are the same (for
example, women generally have greater verbal fluency and men
generally perform better on spatial function tasks); and
(3) Convergent sex differences: average sex differences which
cause males and females to exhibit similar behavioral outcomes but
through different neural mechanisms (for example, men and women

25. See M.E. Kret & B. De Gelder, A Review on Sex Differences in Processing Emotional
Signals, 50 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 1211, 1211–12 (2012) (criticizing the field for reaching
conclusions that reflect stereotypes, even when data could be interpreted in many ways); Becker
et al., supra note 5, at 142; Deboleena Roy, About this Issue, SCHOLAR & FEMINIST ONLINE:
NEUROGENDERINGS
(2019),
http://sfonline.barnard.edu/neurogenderings/about-this-issue
[https://perma.cc/N23Y-CTSJ] (discussing the need to “move us beyond essentializing and
biologically deterministic frameworks”).
26. See Becker et al., supra note 5, at 141.
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may draw on different hormones to lead to compulsive drug use and
addiction). 27
The third category is noteworthy because it demonstrates that
observed structural and functional brain differences do not necessarily
lead to sex-based differences in behavioral outcomes. 28
Research suggests that sex differences in the brain are widespread;
they “exist in every brain lobe, including in many ‘cognitive’ regions
such as the hippocampus, amygdala and neocortex.” 29 Some sex-based
brain differences are global in nature. For example, after controlling
for height and weight, men have larger brain volumes overall compared
to women. 30 Even accounting for this difference in volume, women
appear to have increased gray matter while men have increased white
matter. 31 Most sex-based differences are not in the anatomical
structure, but instead are reflected in a functional way, such as through
neurotransmitter function. 32 For example, women on average have
higher cerebral blood flow than men during cognitive activity and
during rest. 33
This Section addresses some of the aspects of the brain that may
be different for men and women and could conceivably affect legal
outcomes in tort law, particularly with regard to emotional injury. In
each of the following subsections, this Article discusses what each part
of the brain is associated with, the biological differences between men
27. McCarthy et al., supra note 9, at 2241–47; Becker et al., supra note 5, at 141–42.
McCarthy also includes in the third category, “sex convergence and divergence.” McCarthy et al.,
supra note 9, at 2242. Becker adds a fourth category, population (normative) sex differences,
which describes when the average number of males/females with a feature or outcome differ. For
example, more males are mathematicians than females, which may be explained by individual
experiences and sociocultural factors that can affect males and females differently. Becker et al.,
supra note 5, at 141–42. Noting that the field is “fraught with interpretational problems,” Bryant
suggests that differences in traits should be referred to as sex differences, reserving dimorphism
labels only when traits in males and females do not overlap. Bryant et al., supra note 12.
28. Cahill, Why Sex Matters, supra note 10, at *2.
29. See Zeenat F. Zaidi, Gender Differences in Human Brain: A Review, 2 OPEN ANATOMY
J. 37, 39 n.37 (2010) https://benthamopen.com/contents/pdf/TOANATJ/TOANATJ-2-37.pdf
[https://perma.cc/989C-BHNW].
30. Jay N. Giedd et al., Quantitative Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Human Brain
Development: Ages 4–18, 6 CEREBRAL CORTEX 551, 551–60 (1996).
31. Kelly P. Cosgrove, Carolyn M. Mazure & Julie K. Staley, Evolving Knowledge of Sex
Differences in Brain Structure, Function, and Chemistry, 62 BIOLOGICAL PSYCH. 847, 847 (2007);
John S. Allen et al., Sexual Dimorphism and Asymmetries in the Gray-White Composition of the
Human Cerebrum, 18 NEUROIMAGE 880, 880–81 (2003); cf. Bryant et al., supra note 12 (arguing
that “difference . . . is only valid when appropriate statistical corrections for body size are applied”
and noting replication problems and methodological disagreement within the field).
32. Cahill, Why Sex Matters, supra note 10, at *2.
33. Cosgrove et al., supra note 31.
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and women research is uncovering, and the possible implications of
how these differences might portray themselves in behavior, especially
with regard to experiencing extreme stress and emotional memories.
1. Hippocampus. The hippocampus plays a major role in learning
and memory. 34 Like many other structures in the brain, it is a paired
structure, with one in each brain hemisphere. Neuroscience studies
show that male and female hippocampi differ on average in their
structure, their neurochemistry, and their response to stressors. 35
Imaging results suggest that females generally have larger hippocampal
size, 36 which may have genetic underpinnings. 37 The right hippocampus
is generally larger in both sexes, but a female’s left hippocampus
appears to grow more throughout development—making fully
developed female hippocampi more symmetrical than male
hippocampi. 38 However, hippocampal growth is generally quite
dynamic during development and a function of sex and stress
hormones. 39 Since abnormal hippocampal asymmetry has been
associated with memory and cognitive impairments, as well as
neuropsychological disorders, research in this area could be relevant to
brain impairments such as PTSD and clinical depression. 40
34. Id.
35. Id.; but see Bryant et al., supra note 12 (“[H]ippocamp[i] . . . are not sexually dimorphic
as previously claimed.”).
36. Cahill, Why Sex Matters, supra note 10, at *2–5; see also Ruben C. Gur, Tamara Bockow
& Raquel E. Gur, Gender Differences in the Functional Organization of the Brain, in PRINCIPLES
OF GENDER-SPECIFIC MEDICINE 75, 80 (2d ed. 2010) (noting that in his studies, “Cahill concludes
that imaging studies consistently find that the hippocampus is larger in women compared to men
when adjusted for brain size.”). However, a recent study and meta-analysis of MRI images
concludes that there are no sex differences in hippocampal volume. Gabor Perlaki et al., Are
There Any Gender Differences in the Hippocampus Volume After Head-Size Correction? A
Volumetric and Voxel-Based Morphometric Study, 570 NEUROSCI. LETTERS 119, 119 (2014)
(study); Anh Tan et al., The Human Hippocampus Is Not Sexually-Dimorphic: Meta-Analysis of
Structural MRI Volumes, 124 NEUROIMAGE 350, 350 (2016) (meta-analysis).
37. Chris Armoskus et al., Identification of Sexually Dimorphic Genes in the Neonatal Mouse
Cortex and Hippocampus, 1562 BRAIN RSCH. 23, 23 (2014).
38. Akiko Uematsu et al., Developmental Trajectories of Amygdala and Hippocampus from
Infancy to Early Adulthood in Healthy Individuals, 7 PLOS ONE *1, *6–7 (2012),
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0046970&type=printable
[https://perma.cc/53DU-F9SS].
39. L. A. M. Galea et al., Sex, Hormones and Neurogenesis in the Hippocampus: Hormonal
Modulation
of
Neurogenesis
and
Potential
Functional
Implications,
25
J.
NEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 1039, 1039 (2013).
40. Deanne K. Thompson et al., MR-Determined Hippocampal Asymmetry in Full-Term
and Preterm Neonates, 19 HIPPOCAMPUS 118, 119 (2009) (noting that preterm infants
experiencing stressors, and thus potentially implicating hippocampal development, “often have
cognitive and learning deficits, memory impairments, and increased risk of neuropsychological
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Additionally, chronic stress affects the hippocampus cells, which may
have a role in these disorders and may exhibit sex differences as well. 41
Further, scientists have found sex-based differences in the
hippocampus neurotransmitter systems—the body’s chemical
messengers—when responding to stress. 42 One review of over fifty
functional nuclear magnetic resonance imaging (“fMRI”) experiments
found greater stimulation of these chemical messengers in the
hippocampi of women in response to visually observed emotional
stimuli. 43 Other fMRI studies have shown similar results, which
reinforces the idea that sex differences in the hippocampus play a role
in PTSD and similar disorders. 44
2. Amygdala. The amygdala, which plays a significant role in
emotional arousal and recalling emotional experiences, is implicated in
a variety of neurological and psychiatric conditions. 45 It is a paired
structure, located in the brain’s left and right hemispheres, with
demonstrated sex-based structural and functional differences. First,
the amygdala is generally larger in men than in women, when

disorders such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder”). While people with stress-related and
other neuropsychological disorders consistently are shown to have smaller hippocampi, see Tan
et al., supra note 36, at 350, one study suggests that smaller size is a vulnerability for stress
disorders and not a consequence. Lenita Lindgren, Jan Bergdahl & Lars Nyberg, Longitudinal
Evidence for Smaller Hippocampus Volume as a Vulnerability Factor for Perceived Stress, 26
CEREBRAL CORTEX 3527, 3528 (2016).
41. Cahill, Why Sex Matters, supra note 10, at *3.
42. Id.
43. Megan M. Filkowski et al., Sex Differences in Emotional Perception: Meta Analysis of
Divergent Activation, 147 NEUROIMAGE 925, 926, 929 (2017). Similar differences have been
demonstrated in male and female rats. Bruce S. McEwen & Teresa A. Milner, Understanding the
Broad Influence of Sex Hormones and Sex Differences in the Brain, 95 J. NEUROSCI. RSCH. 24, 29
(2017).
44. Matthew Bellace, J. Michael Williams, Feroze B. Mohamed & Scott H. Faro, An fMRI
Study of the Activation of the Hippocampus by Emotional Memory, 123 INT’L. J. NEUROSCI. 121,
*4–5 (2013) [https://perma.cc/W2BP-L9KS] (showing hippocampal response sex differences in
human subjects resulting from exposure to emotional stimuli, including words and images). In
one study, decreasing left hippocampal size appeared connected with verbal memory decline in
women, but decreasing bilateral hippocampus size had no link to memory decline in men. Martin
A. Ystad et al., Hippocampal Volumes Are Important Predictors for Memory Function in Elderly
Women, 9 BMC MED. IMAGING 17, *11–12 (2009), https://bmcmedimaging.biomedcentral.com/
track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2342-9-17 [https://perma.cc/CEV5-EVUH].
45. See generally Elizabeth I. Martin, Kerry J. Ressler, Elisabeth Binder & Charles B.
Nemeroff, The Neurobiology of Anxiety Disorders: Brain Imaging, Genetics, and
Psychoneuroendocrinology, 32 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 549 (2009) (discussing the role of
the amygdala in mood and other anxiety disorders).
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controlling for brain size, 46 even during development. 47 Second, the
amygdala appears to develop earlier and faster in females than in
males. 48 Third, males appear to have larger right amygdala, but females
do not exhibit the same asymmetry. 49
Moreover, neuroscience studies have found sex-based functional
differences in the amygdala as it pertains to the creation and retention
of emotional memories. 50 For example, males and females respond
differently in the left or right amygdala to emotional stimulation. 51 A
meta-analysis of brain scan studies showed greater stimulation of the
left amygdala in women in response to visually observed emotional
stimuli, and the right amygdala in men. 52
The amygdala is also associated with aggressive behavior. 53 One
study discovered a mechanism for how male sex steroids (hormones)

46. Jill M. Goldstein et al., Normal Sexual Dimorphism of the Adult Human Brain Assessed
by In Vivo Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 11 CEREBRAL CORTEX 490, 492 (2001); Ritchie et al.,
supra note 22, at 2969.
47. See Uematsu et al., supra note 38, at *6. However, one meta-analysis found no significant
difference in amygdala size between sexes when controlling for overall brain size differences. See
generally Dhruv Marwha, Meha Halari & Lise Eliot, Meta-Analysis Reveals a Lack of Sexual
Dimorphism in Human Amygdala Volume, 147 NEUROIMAGE 282 (2017) (stating that amygdala
volume “is not selectively enhanced in human males, as often claimed”). Another study found
only moderate sex differences in amygdala size. See Lutz Jäncke, Susan Mérillat, Franziskus Liem
& Jürgen Hänggi, Brain Size, Sex, and the Aging Brain, 36 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 150, 160, 163
(2015).
48. Uematsu et al., supra note 38, at *6.
49. Id. at *8. Data from rat models suggests that sex-based differences may occur early in
development and vary further with puberty and sexual experience. Mariana Zancan et al.,
Remodeling of the Number and Structure of Dendritic Spines in the Medial Amygdala: From
Prepubertal Sexual Dimorphism to Puberty and Effect of Sexual Experience in Male Rats, 48 EUR.
J. NEUROSCI. 1851, 1861 (2018).
50. See Jennifer S. Stevens & Stephan Hamann, Sex Differences in Brain Activation to
Emotional Stimuli: A Meta-Analysis of Neuroimaging Studies, 50 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 1578,
1588 (2012); Cahill, Why Sex Matters, supra note 10, at *4.
51. Cahill, Why Sex Matters, supra note 10, at *4.
52. See Filkowski et al., supra note 43, at 929. Laterality may explain why individuals are
better able to recognize correctly the facial expressions in faces of their own sex: When recalling
fearful faces of one’s sex, the left amygdala tends to be more active in women while the right
amygdala shows greater activity in men. Kret et al., supra note 25, at 1216. Additionally,
testosterone appears to increase the reactivity of the amygdala, though testosterone and
progesterone appear to influence the amygdala’s connection with other regions of the brain in
diverging ways. G. A. van Wingen et al., Gonadal Hormone Regulation of the Emotion Circuitry
in Humans, 191 NEUROSCI. 38, 43 (2011).
53. See generally Maria Mpakopoulou et al., Stereotactic Amygdalotomy in the Management
of Severe Aggressive Behavioral Disorders, 25 NEUROSURGICAL FOCUS 1 (2008) (discussing the
surgical treatment of amygdala for severe aggressive behavioral disorders).
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play a role in amygdala development and differences in behavior. 54 The
research studied the brains of male rats to see how sex steroids could
produce behavioral differences such as greater aggression and rougher
play behavior in juveniles. A key contributor to the differences in play
behavior is a sex-based difference in the number of newborn cells in
the amygdala. The research showed that the male rats had fewer of
these newborn cells because immune cells—activated by
testosterone—actively eliminated them. In other words, fewer
newborn cells led to more aggressive behavior. 55
3. Prefrontal Cortex. The most important function of the
prefrontal cortex is decision-making. Additionally, it is associated with
responses to stress and anxiety. 56 The prefrontal cortex may develop at
different rates in men and women. 57 There may also be sex-based
differences in how the prefrontal cortex responds to emotional stimuli.
For example, in one meta-study, men demonstrated greater
stimulation in the prefrontal cortex in response to visually observed
emotional stimuli. 58
One section of the prefrontal cortex, known as the medial
prefrontal cortex, is associated with PTSD and anxiety. 59 The signaling
54. See generally Jonathan W. VanRyzin et al., Microglial Phagocytosis of Newborn Cells Is
Induced by Endocannabinoids and Sculpts Sex Differences in Juvenile Rat Social Play, 102
NEURON 435 (2019) (“Steroid-mediated masculinization of the rat amygdala during perinatal
development produces higher levels of juvenile rough-and-tumble play by males.”).
55. Id. The functioning of the amygdala likely plays a role in bipolar disorder. See Leslie A.
Hulvershorn et al., Neural Activation During Facial Emotion Processing in Unmedicated Bipolar
Depression, Euthymia, and Mania, 71 BIOLOGICAL PSYCH. 603, 607 (2012). Age may further
implicate sex differences in this condition. Yanqing Tang et al., Age-Specific Effects of Structural
and Functional Connectivity in Prefrontal-Amygdala Circuitry in Women with Bipolar Disorder,
18 BMC PSYCH. 177, *4–6 (2018), https://bmcpsychiatry.biomedcentral.com/track/
pdf/10.1186/s12888-018-1732-9 [https://perma.cc/LCN8-3J5C].
56. Ruud van den Bos, Judith Homberg & Leonie de Visser, A Critical Review of Sex
Differences in Decision-Making Tasks: Focus on the Iowa Gambling Task, 238 BEHAV. BRAIN
RSCH. 95, 100, 102 (2013).
57. See Kelly L. Evans & Elizabeth Hampson, Sex Differences on Prefrontally-Dependent
Cognitive Tasks, 93 BRAIN & COGNITION 42, 43 (2015) (citing several studies that suggest that
the male advantage in object reversal may be attributed to “only a short-term difference in
developmental timing”); see also id. at 49 (suggesting evidence that males may perform better in
prefrontal-cortex-associated decision-making activities involving optimizing outcomes by
preferring options with more long-term advantages).
58. A review of over fifty brain scan studies found greater stimulation in one section of the
prefrontal cortex, the medial prefrontal cortex, in men in response to visually observed emotional
stimuli. Filkowski et al., supra note 43, at 926, 928.
59. Michael Koenigs & Jordan Grafman, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: The Role of
Medial Prefrontal Cortex and Amygdala, 15 NEUROSCIENTIST 540, *1 (2009)
[https://perma.cc/T2DJ-2RQH].
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pathways—a chain of chemical reactions to transmit information—in
the medial prefrontal cortex likely play an important role in psychiatric
disorders. 60 Rat studies show greater social anxiety in females that
scientists can modulate by experimentally amplifying certain signaling
pathways in the medial prefrontal cortex. 61 One study suggests that the
medial prefrontal cortex function related to controlling learned fear
may be more effective in male rats, implicating mechanisms involved
in PTSD. 62
4. Neurochemistry. Studies have shown sexual dimorphisms in a
number
of
neurotransmitter
systems. 63
Two
important
neurotransmitters are dopamine and serotonin. 64 Dopamine regulates
mood and plays a vital role in the brain’s pleasure and reward system,
while serotonin helps regulate one’s mood, sleep cycle, and appetite. 65
Having too much or too little of either neurotransmitter can cause
psychological and physical symptoms. 66 Overall, men appear to
synthesize serotonin faster than women, which could explain the higher
incidence of depression in women. 67 On the other hand, the

60. See Ezequiel Marron Fernandez de Velasco et al., Sex Differences in GABA(B)R-GIRK
Signaling in Layer 5/6 Pyramidal Neurons of the Mouse Prelimbic Cortex, 95
NEUROPHARMACOLOGY 353, 357 (2015).
61. See N. Carrier & M. Kabbaj, Sex Differences in Social Interaction Behaviors in Rats Are
Mediated by Extracellular Signal-Regulated Kinase 2 Expression in the Medial Prefrontal Cortex,
212 NEUROSCI. 86, 88, 90 (2012).
62. See Georgina E. Fenton et al., Persistent Prelimbic Cortex Activity Contributes to
Enhanced Learned Fear Expression in Females, 21 LEARNING & MEMORY 55, 55 (2014). Other
studies in rats point to few sex differences in medial prefrontal cortex- and amygdala-mediated
fear control. Tina M. Gruene et al., Sex-Specific Neuroanatomical Correlates of Fear Expression
in Prefrontal-Amygdala Circuits, 78 BIOLOGICAL PSYCH. 186, 191 (2015).
63. Cahill, Why Sex Matters, supra note 10, at *5 (listing neurotransmitter systems including
serotonin, GABA, acetylcholine, vasopressin, opioid receptors, and monoamines). Some
evidence suggests that there may be an age component related to sex differences as well. See
generally Lara M. Wierenga et al., Unraveling Age, Puberty and Testosterone Effects on
Subcortical Brain Development Across Adolescence, 91 PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 105,
105 (2018) (describing “the complex interactions between chronological age and pubertal
maturational changes,” and finding “puberty unique changes in brain structure that are sex
specific”).
64. Lusi
Madisha,
Difference
Between
Serotonin
and
Dopamine,
DIFFERENCEBETWEEN.NET (Oct. 18, 2019), http://www.differencebetween.net/science/health/
difference-between-serotonin-and-dopamine [https://perma.cc/FD4U-XZBQ].
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. S. Nishizawa et al., Differences Between Males and Females in Rates of Serotonin
Synthesis in Human Brain, 94 PNAS 5308, 5312 (1997).
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neurotransmission of dopamine appears to be more efficient and better
controlled in women. 68
The role of hormones in sex-based brain differences is a significant
area of study. Sex differences in the hormonal effects on brain
organization have been shown in domains of executive function,
memory, social cognition, and sensorimotor speed; the magnitude of
sex differences increases between the ages of eleven and twenty-one. 69
Prenatal hormonal conditions also seem to play a critical role in
dimorphic influences on brain development and behavioral
outcomes. 70
Sex influences exist at all levels of the nervous system. 71 One area
of interest is stress response. Rat studies have revealed a number of
“sex-specific mechanisms involved in stress responses,” suggesting a
correlation between sex-based differences in stress hormone levels and
sex-biased population rates of PTSD. 72 Stress is also a major risk factor
for depression and addiction. 73 Moreover, the influence of stress on
emotional learning and memory processes “are thought to underlie
stress-associated mental disorders.” 74
PTSD is linked to dysregulation of fear, including an increased
fear response and a deficit in fear extinction involved in processing
emotional memories. 75 Women are twice as likely as men to suffer from
PTSD. 76 A recent study implicates the role of certain ovarian steroid
68. Cosgrove et al., supra note 31, at 851. This may have implications for the higher
incidence of Parkinson’s disease in men. Id.
69. Raquel E. Gur & Ruben C. Gur, Sex Differences in Brain and Behavior in Adolescence:
Findings from the Philadelphia Neurodevelopmental Cohort, 70 NEUROSCI. & BIOBEHAV. REVS.
159, 162 (2016) [hereinafter Gur & Gur, Sex Differences]. However, hormonal effects on brain
organization “can dynamically change within relatively short periods throughout life” and not just
during adolescence. Markus Hausmann, Why Sex Hormones Matter for Neuroscience: A Very
Short Review on Sex, Sex Hormones, and Functional Brain Asymmetries, 95 J. NEUROSCI. RSCH.
40, 40 (2017).
70. Becker et al., supra note 5, at 142.
71. Cahill, Why Sex Matters, supra note 10, at *7.
72. Debra A. Bangasser & Brittany Wicks, Sex-Specific Mechanisms for Responding to
Stress, 95 J. NEUROSCI. RSCH. 75, 75 (2017); cf. Gungor et al., supra note 8 (stating that hormones
do not explain women’s greater PTSD risk, but they should be studied to improve our
understanding of the neurobiology of fear processing in both men and women).
73. Abigail Laman-Maharg & Brian C. Trainor, Stress, Sex, and Motivated Behaviors, 95 J.
NEUROSCI. RSCH. 83, 83 (2017).
74. Christian J. Merz & Oliver T. Wolf, Sex Differences in Stress Effects on Emotional
Learning, 95 J. NEUROSCI. RSCH. 93, 93 (2017).
75. Meghna Ravi, Jennifer S. Stevens & Vasiliki Michopoulos, Neuroendocrine Pathways
Underlying Risk and Resilience to PTSD in Women, 55 FRONTIERS IN NEUROENDOCRINOLOGY
*1, *1 (2019) [https://perma.cc/W2NC-A82S].
76. Id. at *2.
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hormones to explain the greater risk and dysregulation of fear
psychophysiology that is associated with PTSD. 77
Finally, there may be neural mechanisms involved in observed
sex-biased differences in drug use and addiction, 78 including the use
and abuse of amphetamine 79 and opioids. 80
5. Other Sex-Based Brain Differences. Numerous other sex-based
brain differences are worthy of note, including the cortex, which is the
outer layer of neural tissue that surrounds the brain. 81 Changes in
cortical volume normally occur during brain development, and
scientists have observed sex-based differences in the rate of volume
change as well as cortical thickness. 82 Variations in cortical volume
changes may be associated with intelligence and risk for psychiatric
disorders. 83 One study suggests that cortical maturation, which occurs
more rapidly in women, may relate to observations of greater empathy
in women. 84
Another example of sex-based brain differences occurs in the
hypothalamus, a small area of the brain that plays an important role in
hormone production. 85 It appears to be associated with aggressive
behaviors in male mice, as ablating of a specific region of the
77. See id. (discussing the role of estradiol, progesterone, and allopregnanolone in fear
psychophysiology).
78. See Becker et al., supra note 5, at 136.
79. See Marina Cholanian et al., Digital Holographic Microscopy Discriminates Sex
Differences in Medial Prefrontal Cortex GABA Neurons Following Amphetamine Sensitization,
124 PHARMACOLOGY, BIOCHEMISTRY & BEHAV. 326, 331–32 (2014) (finding high estradiol in
rats to be associated with greater behavioral hyperactivity following amphetamine treatment,
which suggests a hormonal component behind sex differences in levels of drug use and addiction).
80. Cahill, Why Sex Matters, supra note 10, at *5 (citing J. K. Zubieta, R. F. Dannals & J. J.
Frost, Gender and Age Influences on Human Brain Mu-Opioid Receptor Binding Measured by
PET, 156 AM. J. PSYCH. 842, (1999)) (documenting sex differences in opioid peptides that bind
to opioid receptors in the brain).
81. Khalid H. Jawabri & Sandeep Sharma, Physiology, Cerebral Cortex Functions,
STATPEARLS (2019), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK538496 [https://perma.cc/TU9G9MWA].
82. Jay N. Giedd, Armin Raznahan, Kathryn L. Mills & Rhoshel K. Lenroot, Review:
Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Male/Female Differences in Human Adolescent Brain Anatomy,
3 BIOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES 19, *2 (2012), https://bsd.biomedcentral.com/track/
pdf/10.1186/2042-6410-3-19 [https://perma.cc/RS2A-VXGN]; Armin Raznahan et al., How Does
Your Cortex Grow?, 31 J. NEUROSCI. 7174, 7176 (2011).
83. A. Kadir Mutlu et al., Sex Differences in Thickness, and Folding Developments
Throughout the Cortex, 82 NEUROIMAGE 200, 204 (2013).
84. See id. at 203–05.
85. Robert M. Sargis, An Overview of the Hypothalamus: The Endocrine System’s Link to
the Nervous System, ENDOCRINEWEB (Apr. 8, 2015), https://www.endocrineweb.com/
endocrinology/overview-hypothalamus [https://perma.cc/UC72-FGFG].
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hypothalamus decreases aggression. 86 Research shows that the
hypothalamus-pituitary-adrenal (“HPA”) axis activates faster and
yields greater amounts of stress hormones in women. 87 This may have
implications for sex-biased differences in compulsive drug use. 88
Further, one review of over fifty PET scan studies showed greater
stimulation in women of the dorsal midbrain, a part of the brainstem
where lower brain activity is associated with alertness and Parkinson’s
disease, in response to visually observed emotional stimuli and
perception. 89
Observed sex-based brain differences have led to a separate, but
related, area of study—the relationship between those differences and
observed population differences in behavior. Connecting brain
differences to behavior is the heart of the controversy surrounding
neuroscience studies on sex-based brain differences. This Article now
turns to describing some of these studies.
B. Selective Sex-Biased Population Differences in Behavior
Scientists are beginning to explore whether sex-based brain
differences may be related to population-based differences in behavior
or brain disorders. As noted earlier, these are studies based on
averages in the population and do not denote individual capacity or
ability. Scientists have documented some average population sexbiased differences in cognitive behavior. 90 For example, measurements
indicate females on average perform better than males on memory and
social cognition tasks, and males perform better on spatial and motor
86. Cindy F. Yang et al., Sexually Dimorphic Neurons in the Ventromedial Hypothalamus
Govern Mating in Both Sexes and Aggression in Males, 153 CELL 896, 898 (2013).
87. Nirupa Goel et al., Sex Differences in the HPA Axis, 4 COMPREHENSIVE PHYSIOLOGY
1121, 1145 (2014).
88. Samara A.M. Bobzean, Aliza K. DeNobrega & Linda I. Perrotti, Sex Differences in the
Neurobiology of Drug Addiction, 259 EXPERIMENTAL NEUROLOGY 64, 69 (2014).
89. Filkowski et al., supra note 43, at 925 (stating that the study observed sex differences in
emotional function in the brainstem for the first time). The corpus callosum (“CC”), which
connects the left side of the brain to the right side, shows sex-based differences; on average,
female CCs are larger than those of males. Ralph L. Holloway, In the Trenches with the Corpus
Callosum: Some Redux of Redux, 95 J. NEUROSCI. RSCH. 11, 12 (2017). But see Bryant et al., supra
note 12 (disputing findings of sex-based differences in CC). Abnormalities in the CC have been
associated with autism spectrum disorder, Christine Wu Nordahl et al., Sex Differences in the
Corpus Callosum in Preschool-aged Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder, 6 MOL. AUTISM 26,
*8–10 (2015), https://molecularautism.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/s13229-015-0005-4
[https://perma.cc/2RL2-GWP2], and bipolar disorder, Adrian J. Lloyd et al., Corpus Callosum
Changes in Euthymic Bipolar Affective Disorder, 204 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 129, 129 (2014).
90. Ritchie et al., supra note 22, at 2960; Gur & Gur, Sex Differences, supra note 69, at 159–
60.
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tasks. 91 Furthermore, fMRI studies of inhibitory control, attention,
working memory, and emotion processing in adolescents reveal sexbiased differences. 92
Numerous brain disorders and conditions demonstrate sex-biased
population differences. Some evidence suggests that certain
developmental disorders emerge early in life and are more prevalent
in men, while anxiety and mood disorders emerge later in development
and are more frequent in women. 93 In the general population, men
have higher rates of autism, 94 attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder
(“ADHD”), 95 specific language impairment, 96 Tourette syndrome, 97
dyslexia, 98 schizophrenia, 99 and aggression. 100 Women have higher rates
of depression, 101 anorexia nervosa, 102 PTSD, 103 addictive traits, 104
stroke, 105 autoimmune disorders, 106 Alzheimer’s disease, 107 and
sensitivity to pain. 108
The challenge has been to determine the causal connection
between the acknowledged differences in brain physiology and brain
disorders or behavior. Despite the complexity of the inquiry, it has
become an increasing focus of neuroscience research. 109 Scientists are
beginning to suggest that underlying biological differences between
91. Gur & Gur, Complementarity, supra note 16, at 189.
92. Gur & Gur, Sex Differences, supra note 69, at 166.
93. Id. at 167.
94. McEwen & Milner, supra note 43, at 33.
95. Amber N.V. Ruigrok et al., A Meta-Analysis of Sex Differences in Human Brain
Structure, 39 NEUROSCI. & BEHAV. REVS. 34, 35 (2014).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Kathryn M. Abel, Richard Drake & Jill M. Goldstein, Sex Differences in Schizophrenia,
22 INTERNAL REV. PSYCHIATRY 417, 417 (2010).
100. Gur & Gur, Complementarity, supra note 16, at 193.
101. Ruigrok et al., supra note 95, at 35.
102. Id.
103. Ravi et al., supra note 75; Bangasser & Wicks, supra note 72, at 75.
104. See Becker et al., supra note 5, at 136.
105. See Brooks & Clayton, supra note 5, at 15.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. McEwen & Milner, supra note 43, at 33; Robert Y. North et al., Electrophysiological and
Transcriptomic Correlates of Neuropathic Pain in Human Dorsal Root Ganglion Nerves, 142
BRAIN 1215, 1224 (2019) (suggesting that the presence of sex-specific differences in immune
response and neuronal plasticity is related to radicular/neuropathic pain); see Patti Neighmond,
Women May Be More Adept Than Men at Discerning Pain, NPR (Aug. 26, 2019, 5:06 AM),
https://www.npr.org/741926952 [https://perma.cc/D48E-MG34].
109. See Gur & Gur, Complementarity, supra note 16, at 189.
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male and female brains could help explain some differences in the
prevalence of mental disorders and cognitive and behavioral
differences. As a leading scientist in this area has said, “[t]he mere
existence of sex differences in the incidence and/or nature of a disorder
requires us to examine sex influences in both our basic and clinical
research to fully understand, and treat, the disorder.” 110 For example,
if the amygdala figures into depression or anxiety, then sex-based
differences in that area of the brain may help understand the sex-biased
difference in susceptibility to these brain disorders.
The research is developing; it will advance at different stages for
different areas of the brain and likely will not prove definitive for a
long time. The area of research and its results are still in disputation—
the area is fraught with interpretive disagreements, and undoubtedly,
explanations we accept today will change over time. However, the
findings are real and mark an appropriate time to begin to consider the
impacts these findings may have on other areas of society. Assuming
that neuroscience documents verifiable and significant connections
between sex-based brain differences and brain disorders and behavior,
this Article raises the question of whether this research should
influence the law. The remainder of this Article examines that question
in the context of torts involving emotional injury and the
reasonableness standard.
II. TORT LAW AND THE REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD
This Part examines the development of and theoretical basis for
the reasonable person standard in tort law. Part III looks at some of
the challenges to that standard that neuroscience studies may bring in
the context of emotional and psychological harms.
To determine legal responsibility, a fundamental issue the law
confronts is whether to apply a universal, neutral standard of conduct,
like the reasonable person standard, or to individualize the standard in
certain situations. In theory, tort law applies neutrally to both sexes, in
the name of equality. 111 However, neuroscience studies in sex-based
110. Cahill, Why Sex Matters, supra note 10, at *6 (citing examples of differences in the
disease pathology of Alzheimer’s, schizophrenia, and addiction between men and women);
Gungor et al., supra note 8, at 3 (questioning whether trauma type, rather than pre-existing
vulnerability, explains high rates of PTSD in women).
111. See MAYO MORAN, RETHINKING THE REASONABLE PERSON: AN EGALITARIAN
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD 6 (2003) (explaining that the reasonableness
standard has “powerful links to equality”); but see Martha Chamallas, Feminist Legal Theory and
Tort Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 387 (2019) (arguing that
gender inequalities are built into the “deep structures” of tort law through its failure to recognize
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brain differences may challenge that principle. Building on aspects of
feminist legal theory that recognize a blended approach to issues of
equality in law, this Article concludes that we may one day apply that
approach to the reasonable person standard, like the one courts apply
to children in negligence cases and some courts have applied in hostile
work environment cases, to acknowledge average sex-based brain
differences that cause average differences in the processing and
experiencing of emotional harm. Other sex-based brain differences
may call for exceptions to the general rule as science advances, but
research involving these areas will likely develop first. Applying a
reasonable woman standard in this limited context would be one way
to acknowledge measurable average differences in these experiences.
This Article proceeds with the assumption that science will
document these differences sufficiently to meet legal evidentiary
standards. It does not address the related issue of the admissibility of
this research as evidence in court, although this is a significant hurdle.
The key to using this evidence in legal theory and practice is
determining the strength of the link between sex-based brain
differences, behaviors, and cognitive functioning. 112 The current data
suggest an association, but do not establish a causal link. Proof of a link
sufficient to meet legal standards for causation will generally require a
showing of reliability through replicated, rigorous studies that are peertested and generally accepted within the scientific community. 113
Furthermore, the evidence likely will demonstrate group-based
averages and increased likelihood of certain behavior and reactions
and will not be indicative of individual traits or abilities. Although
sometimes courts accept categorical evidence in certain settings, 114
these limitations may raise questions of relevance.
claims of particular importance to women, such as claims for witnessing harm to their young
children; third-party liability for sexual harassment, coercion, and violence; claims arising from
reproductive injuries; and gender-biased calculations of damages) [hereinafter Chamallas,
Feminist Legal Theory and Tort Law].
112. Courts are inconsistent in their approaches to admitting expert testimony on general
group-level phenomena and applying it to specific cases. See David L. Faigman, John Monahan
& Christopher Slobogin, Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81
U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 432–40 (2014) (examining courts’ use of general expert testimony on
eyewitness testimony, medical and psychological conditions, employment discrimination, and
forensic identification). Courts exercise caution when it comes to proffering novel syndrome or
theory evidence to be applied to the case at hand. Id. at 434 (citing examples of rape-trauma
syndrome and battered woman syndrome).
113. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 580 (1993).
114. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (“[D]evelopments in psychology and brain
science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.”); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 553 (2005) (stating that the Constitution bars capital punishment for
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A. From Reasonable Man to Reasonable Person
The reasonable person standard is a measure to help courts and
juries determine whether the defendant’s behavior fell below a certain
standard of care. 115 Using the reasonableness standard to determine
the requisite standard of care is ubiquitous across the legal
landscape. 116 The primary reason for the standard’s ubiquity is
promoting an egalitarian standard of responsibility and the rule of
law. 117 A secondary reason is its flexibility in application. 118
In tort law, actors must conform to the general duty of due care, 119
or be held accountable for their actions. 120 Tort law frequently applies
the standard of the reasonable person—originally cast as the

juvenile offenders and recognizing categorical differences between juveniles and adults); Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 304 (2002) (rejecting the death penalty for the intellectually disabled);
Jozsef Meszaros, Achieving Peace of Mind: The Benefits of Neurobiological Evidence for Battered
Women Defendants, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 117, 120 (2011) (arguing for the integration of
neurobiological evidence into the defense of battered women); see also Brown v. Ent. Merchs.
Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 852 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing “cutting-edge neuroscience” to
support the argument that violent video games are linked to aggressive behavior).
115. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Reasonableness In and Out of Negligence Law, 163 U. PA. L.
REV. 2131, 2134 (2015).
116. See Alan Calnan, Essay, The Nature of Reasonableness, 105 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE
81, 81 (2020) (“[R]easonableness is one of the foundational concepts of American law. . . .”);
Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Reasonableness, 102 MINN. L. REV. 61, 69–70 (describing use
of the reasonableness concept across the legal landscape); Robert Unikel, “Reasonable” Doubts:
A Critique of the Reasonable Woman Standard in American Jurisprudence, 87 NW. L. REV. 326,
327 (1992) (“‘[R]easonableness’ has gained a prominent position in almost every area of
American law. A general survey reveals that the concept of ‘reasonableness’ is a standard of
decisionmaking in administrative law, bailment law, constitutional law, contract law, criminal law,
tort law, and the law of trusts.”); Frédéric G. Sourgens, Reason and Reasonableness: The
Necessary Diversity of the Common Law, 67 ME. L. REV. 73, 74 (2014) (“Reasonableness is the
keystone of the common law.”); Zipursky, supra note 115, at 2135–49 (listing examples of the use
of reasonableness in law).
117. See MORAN, supra note 111, at 6 (stating that the reasonableness standard has “powerful
links to equality”).
118. Garrett, supra note 116, at 62 (“[T]he flexibility and malleability of reasonableness
standards [in constitutional law] accounts for their ubiquity and utility. . . .”); id. at 70 (quoting
James Gibson, Doctrinal Feedback and (Un)reasonable Care, 94 VA. L. REV. 1641, 1643 (2008))
(“In tort law, the flexibility of the concept of reasonable care may be a weakness, but also its
strength, giving courts the ability . . . ‘to arrive at the correct judgment in a fact-dependent
context,’ even if the concept is ‘frustratingly imprecise’. . . .”); Sourgens, supra note 116, at 74
(“The edifice of the common law would collapse but for the balance struck between diverse and
competing ends and interests by ‘reasonableness.’”).
119. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise
reasonable care under all the circumstances.”).
120. See DANIEL B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, HORNBOOK ON
TORTS § 10.5 (2d ed. 2016).
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reasonable man—to determine this duty, 121 looking to the conduct that
a hypothetical reasonable person would exercise in the position of the
defendant to avoid harming others. 122 If the individual’s behavior falls
below that standard, the law finds that the actor breached the duty of
care.
Scholars engage in significant debate about whether the
reasonable person standard of due care in negligence law is descriptive,
prescriptive, or both. 123 Although the modern majority view is that the
foundation of the standard encompasses more than the idea of
empirical average conduct, scholars still disagree about the normative
basis of the standard. 124 This Article subscribes to the view that the
reasonableness standard is largely normative but is informed by
descriptive elements; 125 both aspects are relevant to the standard. 126
Regardless of the varying principles behind the standard and its
male-oriented origins, the reasonableness standard generally seeks to
promote objectivity 127 and judicial neutrality, both core legal values. 128
121. See Kerns, supra note 24, at 210–12 (2001) (describing the evolution of the reasonable
man standard to the reasonable person standard).
122. Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 325
(2012).
123. Much ink has been spilled over whether the reasonable person standard is normative or
descriptive or both. See id. at 323 (“[N]ormative definitions [of reasonableness] are categorically
preferable to positive definitions, because the latter are logically unacceptable. . . .”); Kevin P.
Tobia, How People Judge What is Reasonable, 70 ALA. L. REV. 293, 296 (2018) (explaining that
the reasonableness standard “is best understood as a hybrid notion that is partly statistical and
partly prescriptive”); Garrett, supra note 116, at 61; Sourgens, supra note 116, at 78. See MORAN,
supra note 111, at 7 (describing tension between descriptive and normative components of the
reasonable person standard).
124. These ideals include economic efficiency, fairness, community values, utilitarianism, and
virtue. See Calnan, supra note 116, at 3 (arguing that reasonableness concept has physiological
origins and susceptible to scientific investigation); Sourgens, supra note 116, at 78 (explaining that
the common law “relies upon inconsistent pragmatic, formalist, and utilitarian reasonableness
paradigms”); Zipursky, supra note 115, at 2142 (proposing a theory of reasonableness as one of
mutuality); Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort
Law, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1431, 1432 (2000) (explaining tort doctrine from a virtue ethics
viewpoint).
125. See The T. J. Hooper v. N. Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
126. See Zipursky, supra note 115, at 2149–50; Tobia, supra note 123, at 342 (stating that the
hybrid view seeks to avoid some of the absurdities of either a strictly statistical standard—raising
problems of average accidents and reasonable racism—or a strictly prescriptive view—protecting
consumers only in situations in which they ought to be misled); MORAN, supra note 111, at 2
(“The way that the reasonable person seamlessly intertwines the normative and descriptive may
be one source of his appeal . . . .”).
127. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 120, § 9.7 (stating that the reasonable person approach
“reflects the law’s strong commitment to an objective standard of behavior”); Unikel, supra note
116, at 330.
128. Unikel, supra note 116, at 326.
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The law depends on neutrality to avoid favoring one individual or
group over another for illegitimate reasons and draws from the
fundamental goal of equal protection of the law. 129 The objective
standard signals to the community what constitutes acceptable
behavior: to use a subjective standard “would leave so vague a line as
to afford no rule at all, the degree of judgment belonging to each
individual being infinitely various . . . .” 130 Courts therefore reject a
“best efforts” defense and do not allow individuals to set their own
standards of conduct. 131
Thus, the law expects individuals to act with normal intelligence,
perception, and memory, given the situation facing the actor. 132 In
particular, tort law takes into account very few individual
characteristics, even including mental capacity or old age, in judging
behavior. 133 The law relies on rough averages of behavior reflected in
custom or industry practice to help inform what constitutes reasonable
behavior. 134 In the end, though, we leave it to individual juries, not strict
guidelines, to determine what behavior is reasonable in given
circumstances. 135
In some limited settings, tort law takes into account the
perspective and capabilities of people like the actor. 136 This allows the
129. See MORAN, supra note 111, at 10 (drawing on John Rawls’s discussion of the rule of
law which “clarifies that under a system of the rule of law, judicial decision-making must at a
minimum exhibit a certain kind of equality across cases”).
130. Vaughan v. Menlove (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493 (C.P.).
131. See id.
132. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 120, §§ 10.8, 10.12.
133. Id. § 10.8; Kristin Harlow, Applying the Reasonable Person Standard to Psychosis: How
Tort Law Unfairly Burdens Adults with Mental Illness, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1733, 1738, 1743 (2007).
As Justice Holmes stated, the standards applied to the reasonable person are “standards of
general application. The law takes no account of the infinite varieties of temperament, intellect,
and education which make the internal character of a given act so different in different men.”
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 108 (1881). Thus, an external, objective
standard of care avoids arbitrary interpretation and unfairness to other members of the
community.
134. The reasonableness standard is defended by its “unifying power, even if, in practice,
what is reasonable is highly fact-dependent and will require fact-sensitive and industry-sensitive
judgments.” Garrett, supra note 116, at 108 (citing David Zaring, Rule by Reasonableness, 63
ADMIN. L. REV. 525, 538–39 (2011)).
135. See Mark P. Gergen, The Jury’s Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the American
Common Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 407, 424–25 (1999); see, e.g., 7A MICH. CIV. PRAC. FORMS
§ 127:30 (2020) (“The law does not say what a reasonably careful person would do or would not
do under the circumstances. That is for you to decide.”); cf. MORAN, supra note 111, at 305–06
(discussing the difficulties of determining what behavior is reasonable).
136. Tort law sometimes takes into account objectively verifiable physical characteristics in
certain groups, such as the disabled, in judging behavior. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 120, § 10.9;
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (stating that for children,
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applicable standard to be closer to the attributes of the individual being
judged. 137 The classic example is children. 138 The common law
measures the behavior of a child against the standard of an ordinary
child of like age, experience, and intelligence when engaged in
children’s activities. 139 This blended standard allows greater
consideration of subjective factors than the traditional standard
permits, including capacity. Tort law offers various justifications for
this special treatment. 140 At bottom, the exception reflects a societal
view that we should not hold children to the same standard as
reasonable adults when they are engaging in children’s activities, but
rather to the behavior of someone more like themselves. 141 This
blended approach takes into account an attribute that is descriptive,
but compares it against a normative standard.
The problem of individualization—when to take personal
characteristics into account in judging behavior—is a difficult one. 142
the reasonable person standard can take into account the perspective of those of “like age,
intelligence, and experience under like circumstances”). Higher skill is another exception. Tort
law measures professional standards by using external measures of skill of the profession. The
prototype is medical malpractice, in which we measure a doctor’s treatment of a patient against
the treatment of a reasonable doctor in a similar medical field to determine whether the treatment
fell below the medical standard of care. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 120, § 21.6.
137. See MORAN, supra note 111, at 279–80 (describing how further contextualization and
particularization of a reasonableness standard will result in a standard that “more closely
approximate[s] the individual being judged”).
138. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 10 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“A child’s conduct is negligent if it does not conform to that
of a reasonably careful person of the same age, intelligence and experience . . . .”); DOBBS ET AL.,
supra note 120, § 10.14 (stating that children are required to conform to the standard of a child of
similar age and abilities); MORAN, supra note 111, at 6 (finding that when judging children, courts
demand that “the characteristics of the legal person closely mirror those of the actual person
whose behaviour is being judged”).
139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 10.
140. Justifications include the belief that children develop cognitive and physical abilities at
different rates; children should develop at their own pace; the law should reflect the normative
view of what children ought to do; and perhaps the law assumes that others in the community will
take care to avoid the consequences of children’s activities. See Betsy J. Grey, Implications of
Neuroscience Advances in Tort Law: A General Overview, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 671, 682
(2015); MORAN, supra note 111, at 9 (suggesting that the special standard for children refers to
how normal childhood is, and may reflect our view of their importance to society as opposed to
other minority groups); Harlow, supra note 133, at 1740–42 (describing the development of the
negligence standard for children); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
& EMOTIONAL HARM § 10 cmt. b.
141. Cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (taking age into account for application
of the death penalty).
142. See Tobia, supra note 123, at 346–47 (finding that the problem of individualization “is
important and difficult, and . . . is largely separate from the statistical, prescriptive, and hybrid
debate”). See generally David E. Seidelson, Reasonable Expectations and Subjective Standards in
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Although characteristics such as age, gender, mental illness, and
culture have challenged application of the universal standard and have
occasionally created exceptions, 143 recognizing differences can create
as many problems as it solves. Tort law cannot take into account every
individual characteristic—driven by either objective capacity
differences or normative values—in determining reasonableness
because it would leave us with practically no general standard. 144 The
concern is that individualization will allow discriminatory concepts to
bleed into the objective reasonableness standard, implying some kind
of differences in race or sex that we consider illegitimate
considerations. 145 Fundamentally, individualization challenges the goal
of equality. 146 The critical question is, therefore, when—if ever—tort
law should make an exception.
The origins of the reasonableness standard in tort law reflect this
struggle. Until relatively recently, reasonable conduct referred to the
“reasonable man” as the reference point, 147 implying male attributes to
the reasonableness standard. 148 Courts gradually removed references
to sex in an attempt to eliminate a masculine orientation of the
standard. 149
Negligence Law: The Minor, the Mentally Impaired, and the Mentally Incompetent, 50 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 17, 20–26 (1981) (discussing the reasonableness standard as applied to minors).
143. See Tobia, supra note 123, at 346–47.
144. See id. at 348 (“[E]ven if the statistical view [of the reasonable person standard] only
acknowledges features with a statistically significant impact . . . , we will still have far too many
individualized reasonableness standards.”); MORAN, supra note 111, at 3 (“[W]ithout a clear
sense of which qualities of the reasonable person matter normatively and which do not, the
standard threatens to disappear into a description of the actual person.”); Tobia, supra note 118,
at 349 (“From a prescriptivist perspective, individualization—like reasonableness—is not about
statistical patterns of behavior; instead, it is about normatively correct behaviors.”).
145. See MORAN, supra note 111, at 307 (“[P]ersonification makes it so difficult to articulate
a standard that is appropriately sensitive to equality without implying some kind of essential
moral and epistemological differences among genders, races, and the like.”).
146. Id. at 274.
147. See Margo Schlanger, Injured Women Before Common Law Courts, 1860 – 1930, 21
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 79, 80–82 (1998). A quote often cited as an example is an English court’s
description that the “reasonable man” is “the man who takes the magazines at home, and in the
evening pushes the lawn mower in his shirt sleeves.” Hall v. Brooklands Auto-Racing Club, [1932]
1 K.B. 205, 224.
148. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3,
22 (1988); DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW
20 (1991); see also Garrett, supra note 116, at 63 (“Commentators have long critiqued reasonable
man and reasonable person standards in common law fields for assuming perspectives that, in
fact, bring in non-objective assumptions about conduct.”).
149. See Miller & Perry, supra note 122, at 362 (noting how feminist theory, after the change
to “reasonable person,” argued that the standard was still given a masculine orientation). Some
authors have argued that the reasonable person standard still has a male bias. See Bender, supra
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Many scholars argue that, despite the change, traditional male
values continue to permeate negligence law. 150 As an early critic,
Professor Leslie Bender argued that the change from the reasonable
man to the reasonable person standard was mostly cosmetic and
disparate in its application. 151 A strong theme in feminist criticism is
that the law generally has not sufficiently recognized women’s
experiences. 152 Thus, the facially neutral reasonable person standard is
not neutral as applied. 153 The debate continues. 154
A notable breakthrough in applying sex-based standards to a
reasonable person test has occurred in the area of hostile work
note 148, at 22; see generally Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy, and the Reasonable Woman,
1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 769 (arguing that the reasonableness standard is still male-oriented).
150. See Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman
Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398, 1404 (1992) (“The male bias
inherent in a standard that explicitly excludes consideration of women as reasonable actors is
obvious.”); Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of
Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1178 (1990) (“[D]efinitions of
reasonableness often reflect the values and assumptions of a narrow elite . . . .”); MORAN, supra
note 111, at 199 (“The suspiciously masculine nature of the reasonable person is one of the most
long-standing topics of discussion in the general literature on feminism and the law.”).
151. See Bender, supra note 148, at 22. As Professor Leslie Bender explained, “[o]ur legal
system . . . is a system that resolves problems through male inquiries formulated from distanced,
abstract, and acontextual vantage points, while feminism emphasizes relationships, context, and
factual particulars for resolving human problems.” Id. at 10–11; see also RHODE, supra note 148,
at 20.
152. See Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding Theories, 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN’S L.J. 191, 191 (1989) (“What makes any theory particularly feminist is that it is derived
from female experience, from a point of view contrary to the dominant male perception of
reality.”); Chamallas, supra note 111, at 387 (“The unstated norms in tort doctrines still tend to
be based on men’s life experiences.”).
153. Bender, supra note 148, at 23 (“When [the reasonable man standard] was converted to
‘reasonable person,’ it still meant ‘person who is reasonable by my standards’ almost exclusively
from the perspective of a male judge, lawyer, or law professor . . . .”). Some theorists challenged
Bender’s premise that the reasonableness standard is always based on a “male perspective.” See
Schlanger, supra note 147, at 85. After examining case studies of nineteenth and early twentieth
century cases involving injuries to women, Professor Margo Schlanger argued that these cases
demonstrate that, “[f]ar from naively erasing gender by subsuming women into the male category
of ‘reasonable men’ or a purportedly neutral, but no less male category of ‘reasonable persons,’
courts actually treated gender as an important factor in assessing appropriate standards of care.”
Id. at 84–85. She argued that these cases do not “support a charge of invariable refusal to take
account of women’s experience, or of consistent deprecation of women’s capabilities.” Id. at 85.
154. As Professor Brandon Garrett observed: “Common criticisms remain that
reasonableness tends to be interpreted to reflect standards of care that do not reflect diverse
viewpoints, but rather those of reductionist, or majority, or male viewpoints; a non-emotional
perspective; or a privileged judicial perspective.” Garrett, supra note 116, at 72; see MORAN, supra
note 111, at 274 (“The worry for equality seekers is that in the very kinds of cases that most
concern them, the presence of widespread ‘unreasonable’—non-egalitarian—beliefs will hold out
an alternative reading of reasonableness that enables discriminatory beliefs to feed into the
‘objective’ standard.”).
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environment litigation. 155 The Ninth Circuit was the first circuit court
to adopt the reasonable woman standard in the Title VII context in
Ellison v. Brady. 156 The court justified its use of the standard because a
“sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased and
tends to systematically ignore the experiences of women.” 157 In a later
case involving sexual harassment, the Ninth Circuit applied a standard
based on a reasonable person in the same protected classification as
the plaintiff, such as a reasonable woman. 158 In Rabidue v. Osceola
Refining Co., 159 a Sixth Circuit case that arose from an allegedly hostile
work environment, the dissent argued in favor of applying a reasonable
woman standard in that context. 160 Other circuits have applied the
perspective of women in the workplace when judging hostile work
environment claims. 161
These courts were more concerned with cultural differences
between men and women, whereas this Article focuses on empirical
biological differences between men and women. Similar objections are
raised, however, to recognizing sex-based differences in a legal context.
Some scholars have argued that use of the reasonable woman standard
155. E.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); Rabidue v. Osceola Refin. Co.,
805 F.2d 611, 626 (6th Cir. 1986); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, The Reasonable Woman Standard: A
Meta-Analytic Review of Gender Differences in Perceptions of Sexual Harassment, 22 L. &
HUMAN BEHAV. 33, 34–35 (1998); Cahn, supra note 150, at 1409; Barbara A. Gutek & Maureen
O’Connor, The Empirical Basis for the Reasonable Woman Standard, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES 151, 152
(1995); Elizabeth L. Shoenfelt et al., Reasonable Person Versus Reasonable Woman: Does It
Matter?, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y, & L. 633, 637 (2002). See MORAN, supra note 111, at
276–81 (discussing the development, use, and debate around the “reasonable woman” standard).
156. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
157. Id. at 879.
158. EEOC v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 422 F.3d 840, 845–46 (9th Cir. 2005).
159. Rabidue v. Osceola Refin. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
160. Id. at 626–27 (Keith, J., dissenting). According to the Supreme Court, a hostile work
environment is one “that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive.” Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). In a later case, the Court explained that this “reasonable person”
must be viewed “in the plaintiff’s position considering ‘all the circumstances.’” Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). In determining the view of the reasonable
person, the factfinder should undergo “careful consideration of the social context in which
particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target.” Id.; see MORAN supra note 117, at
275 (“[C]oncerns about how the reasonable person standard has incorporated ‘ordinary’ male
sexual harassment have caused many feminists and even some courts to abandon that standard in
favour of a standard premissed [sic] on the ‘reasonable woman.’”).
161. See, e.g., Fuller v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., 865 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2017); Clayton v.
City of Atl. City, 538 F. App’x 124, 128 (3d Cir. 2013); Gray v. Genlyte Grp., Inc., 289 F.3d 128,
133 (1st Cir. 2002); Woods v. Delta Beverage Grp., Inc., 274 F.3d 295, 301 (5th Cir. 2001). The
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have rejected application of a reasonable woman
standard, however. See Alyssa Agostino, The Reasonable Woman Standard’s Creation of the
Reasonable Man Standard: The Ethical and Practical Implications of the Two Standards and Why
They Should Be Abandoned, 41 J. LEGAL PRO. 339, 339 (2017).
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in the hostile work environment context would reinforce stereotypes
about women as victims, 162 or as being more moral than men. 163 These
critics question whether women who are situated differently—in class
or race for example—could even possess the homogeneity suggested
by the reasonable woman standard. 164
To contend with some of these issues in the context of sex-based
brain differences, the next section briefly describes the main
approaches in feminist jurisprudence to creating standards and
maintaining equality in law.
B. Feminist Considerations on the Adoption of Differentiating
Standards Based on Sex
Scholars of feminist jurisprudence have grappled with approaches
to creating standards and promoting equality in law, 165 including the
use of the reasonable woman standard. 166 A central question for many
feminist scholars is whether women’s equality is best promoted by
emphasizing sameness and adopting universal legal standards or by
recognizing and embracing differences between the sexes. 167 Professor
Martha Minow labeled this the “dilemma of difference” and explained:
“The stigma of difference may be recreated both by ignoring and by
focusing on it . . . . The problems of inequality can be exacerbated both
by treating members of minority groups the same as members of the
majority and by treating the two groups differently.” 168 Three main
views of feminist theory as applied to the reasonable person standard
highlight this dilemma of difference.

162. Jolynn Childers, Is There a Place for a Reasonable Woman in the Law? A Discussion of
Recent Developments in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 42 DUKE L.J. 854, 896 (1993).
163. Cahn, supra note 150, at 1415.
164. See Childers, supra note 162, at 889–90 (noting that feminist critics argued that any
reasonable woman standard will reflect a “white, upper-middle-class bias”). Others suggest that
the reasonable woman standard would allow application of a standard that reflects different social
circumstances, by further contextualizing the standard. See Cahn, supra note 150, at 1417–20,
1435.
165. This brief description vastly oversimplifies a diverse and rich field of thinking and does
not attempt to capture all the various strains of thought in this area. For an excellent overview of
different feminist jurisprudence theories and their varying threads, see generally CYNTHIA
GRANT BOWMAN, LAURA A. ROSENBURY, DEBORAH TUERKHEIMER & KIMBERLY A.
YURACKO, FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2018), and MARTHA
MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990).
166. MORAN, supra note 111, at 278.
167. NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: A PRIMER 18
(2d ed. 2016).
168. MINOW, supra note 165, at 20.
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One view, liberal feminism, emphasizes equal treatment under the
law and draws from formal equality theory, which traces back to the
liberal democratic theory of John Stuart Mill. 169 Under this view,
inequality means treating similarly situated women and men
differently. Thus, laws using sex-based classifications, often
“rationalized as reflecting ‘natural’ differences between the sexes,” are
frequently based on stereotypes, which defeat the goal of giving
individuals an equal opportunity to compete in the public spheres. 170
Liberal feminism would resist any sex-specific classifications. 171 This
view would argue in favor of a single, non-sex-specific, and faciallyneutral reasonable person standard in tort law.
A second view emphasizes the biological and socially constructed
differences between men as a group and women as a group, including
the ways in which they view the world. 172 “Difference” theorists
examine facially neutral laws that affect women and men differently,
and examine whether those laws should take sex-based differences into
account. 173 Difference theorists would argue in favor of reexamining
the reasonable person standard in light of its actual—unequal—
application.
Finally, some theorists promote a “blended” approach. As
Professor Ann Bartow explained, these theorists “believ[e] that for
women to achieve true and meaningful equality, sometimes the law
needs to treat women and men as equals, and other times it needs to
acknowledge and control for differences related to gender.” 174 This

169. See West, supra note 1, at 991.
170. Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal Thought
of the 1970s, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 9, 11 (1989); see id. at 14–15, 17. We often refer to this as
leveling the playing field, to take away public-sphere obstacles to equal competition.
171. As Professors Alan Miller and Ronen Perry explained,
distinguishing between reasonable women and reasonable men impairs the neutrality
and objectivity of the concept of reasonableness, which is intended to set equal
boundaries on all persons’ conduct and to afford equal protection to all persons’
interests. A separate standard for women reinforces the anachronistic notion that men
and women should not be treated equally.
Miller & Perry, supra note 122, at 363.
172. See Robin L. West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 149, 149–53 (2000).
173. Two branches of this line of thinking—cultural feminism, which demands reevaluation
of traditionally feminine activities and traits, and radical feminism, which condemns sexual
exploitation—reflect this focus. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE
MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW 7 (2010).
174. Ann Bartow, Legal Theory Lexicon 061: Feminist Legal Theory, LEGAL THEORY
LEXICON (Nov. 19, 2006), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2006/11/legal_theory_
le.html [https://perma.cc/7342-HJNL].
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approach would argue in favor of adopting a reasonable woman
standard in some contexts. 175
Some theorists criticize the view of women as a monolithic group
under any of these theories since experiences may be shaped by
differences other than sex, such as race, class, sexual orientation, and
ethnicity. 176 Under the intersectionalist view, the search for a
reasonable woman’s viewpoint could prove futile since “the values of
the dominant members of the group—namely, white, affluent,
heterosexual women—would be construed as representative of the
whole.” 177
Neuroscience studies should inform this debate and force the law
to reconsider the reasonableness standard in a new light. The emerging
science may allow us to take better measure of people’s experiences
based on physiology. It would allow lawmakers and judges to confront
the problem of whether to apply a blended approach to tort law, at

175. As Professor Naomi Cahn has argued, egalitarian considerations can be realized in a
standard that “subjectively considers the pressure on an individual who is a member of a
community with explicit standards for her behavior.” Cahn, supra note 150, at 1436. Miller and
Perry reconstitute these feminist approaches as applied to the reasonableness standards into three
formulations: “weak,” “intermediate,” and “strong.” Miller & Perry, supra note 122, at 362–63
(2012). The weak formulation would apply some gender aspects to the objective standard. Id. at
362. The intermediate standard—an inclusive one—would include all feminist perspectives,
experiences, and capabilities to create a single, neutral reasonable person standard. Id. at 364
(citing Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women’s Issues in a Torts Course, 1
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 63–64 (1989)). The strong formulation would subject all persons to a
feminine standard of care, such as a duty to rescue regardless of a prior relationship. Id. (citing
CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S
DEVELOPMENT 19 (1982)).
176. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139–40 (1989); see also Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241,
1245–51 (1991) (showing that women of color experience more violent harm due to intersectional
effects). The problem of intersectionality—that experiences are shaped by factors other than sex,
such as class, ethnicity, age, race, and disability—is the focus of much of the “third wave” of
feminism, starting in the late 1980s. West, supra note 1, at 980 n.12. The intersectionalist view
demands that feminists recognize the different societal hierarchies of women since some women
are more privileged than others due to these hierarchies. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION
TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 6–7 (3d ed. 2013) [hereinafter CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY]. As Professor Martha Chamallas stated, “[t]he intersectional move is
designed to curb the temptation to speak in universal terms, a habit feminists detest in maleoriented scholarship and language.” Id. at 7. This Article does not seek to marginalize these
legitimate considerations nor their influences on behavior. It merely seeks to focus on
neuroscientific scholarship available on sex-based brain differences.
177. Id. at 319. Relatedly, a major criticism of the reasonable woman standard is its potential
failure to recognize that not everyone conforms to the gender stereotype. Miller & Perry, supra
note 122, at 363; see MORAN, supra note 111, at 278–79.
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times taking into account empirical sex differences. This could mean
incorporating a reasonable woman standard in certain limited settings,
such as those freestanding torts that involve emotional harm.
III. NEUROBIOLOGY CHALLENGES TO THE REASONABLE PERSON
STANDARD
As science gets better at measuring average sex-based brain
differences and tracing their impact on behavior, particularly those that
affect processing stress, trauma, and storing emotional memory, these
advances may force the law to consider whether quantifiable
differences should inform tort law in determining duty and breach in
emotional harm claims. 178
More specifically, science may force the law to confront the issue
of whether to move from the traditional liberal feminist view of the
reasonable person standard to one that reflects the legal feminist
theory “blended” approach. In other words, this would mean changing
the reasonable person standard from one that prioritizes equality in
law over the recognition of sex-based differences to a standard that
considers average sex-based differences in limited settings, such as
those involving average physiological experiences of extreme stress
and trauma. The experience of stress and emotional injury is inherently
individualistic, so these averages will not predict individual reactions
to emotional harm. Would taking these average differences into
account create an objective, more accurate, and biologically-informed
standard of care, or would this simply return us to the anachronistic
view that women and men are not equals and should be held to
different standards?
This Part examines this question in the context of two freestanding
emotional harm claims in tort law, NIED and IIED claims, particularly
in a hostile work environment. Although the first claim judges
negligent behavior and the second judges intentional behavior, they
apply similar reasonableness tests to evaluate the harm suffered and
limit the availability of the claims. In addition, the IIED claim uses a
reasonableness standard to evaluate the outrageousness of the

178. This is not to suggest that scientific labels are not value-laden. In fact, when science
labels something as normal or pathological, it is to some extent importing notions of value. See
MORAN, supra note 111, at 145 (“[T]he idea of normal is problematic even in its scientific
application.”). Feminist critics point out that seemingly neutral categories in science can distort
our understanding of the natural world. Id. at 146 (citing literature on science and gender). The
concept of normal has been used to justify unequal treatment of women and the developmentally
disabled, along with the exclusion from full privileges of citizenship. Id. at 146–47.
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intentional misconduct, another limiting test tied to the reasonableness
of the reaction. Given the scientific studies discussed above that
suggest that men and women experience and process emotional injury
in different ways, they offer good exemplars for examining how science
could challenge the reasonableness standards applied in those
contexts.
A. The Reasonable Reaction and Outrageousness Test in Emotional
Harm Claims
Both NIED and IIED claims curtail emotional harm claims by
evaluating the reasonableness of the reaction to the tortious behavior
inflicted on the plaintiff, a limitation that does not arise in traditional
torts. In addition, the IIED claim applies a similar test to determine the
outrageousness of the behavior at issue. After describing the use of
these tests under both NIED and IIED claims, this Section discusses
how neuroscience studies could influence the application of these tests.
Two main types of claims comprise the NIED tort: negligent
conduct that (1) directly imposes emotional harm on the plaintiff
(“direct harm cases”); or (2) imposes emotional harm resulting from
witnessing bodily harm to a third person (“bystander cases”). 179 The
law traditionally treats both types of NIED claims more restrictively
than the classic negligence case, with the explanations that it is more
difficult to evaluate emotional injury than physical and property harm;
physical and property damage deserve priority; and a more liberal
standard may lead to disproportionate liability. 180
A significant limiting test applied to direct harm cases 181 evaluates
the harm suffered by the plaintiff compared to a reasonable person’s
reaction to the same harm. 182 Thus, courts often require that the
inflicted harm be such that it would cause severe emotional distress in

179. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 120, § 29.9.
180. See Chamallas, Feminist Legal Theory and Tort Law, supra note 111, at 400, 402. I have
argued elsewhere that neuroscience advances may eventually give us ways to validate emotional
stress responses and lead us to strike down some of these extra barriers. See Betsy J. Grey, The
Future of Emotional Harm, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2605, 2647 (2015)
181. Although courts do not typically apply the same reasonable reaction test to bystander
NIED claims, they achieve the same effect through other limitations. See, e.g., Portee v. Jaffee,
417 A.2d 521, 527 (N.J. 1980) (limiting the availability of bystander claims to individuals who
witnessed the contemporaneous serious injury or death of a close family member due to a
defendant’s negligence). The assumption is that reasonable people would suffer severe emotional
distress in that context. Id. (“[T]he scope of recovery must be circumscribed to negligent conduct
which strikes at the plaintiff’s basic emotional security.”).
182. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 120, § 29.9.

2020]

SEX-BASED BRAIN DIFFERENCES

61

an ordinarily sensitive person. 183 If a reasonable person would be able
to withstand the behavior without suffering severe emotional stress,
then the law does not recognize a tort, even if the plaintiff actually
suffered emotional distress. 184 This limitation to duty and breach is in
contrast to the usual damages rule in torts of the “thin-skulled”
plaintiff, under which the defendant is responsible for the injury caused
even if it is unusually extensive. 185
The other traditional freestanding emotional harm claim, IIED,
or the tort of outrage, 186 also incorporates a reasonableness standard.
The standard surfaces in two elements: (1) the distress suffered must
be severe; 187 and (2) the behavior must be outrageous. 188
A demonstration of severe distress typically applies a
reasonableness standard similar to that applied in the NIED setting.
“The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that
no reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it.” 189 Courts
interpret this test to mean a person of “ordinary sensitivities.” 190

183. See Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 6 F.3d 898, 908 (2d Cir. 1993); DiMare
v. RealtyTrac, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 2d 199, 211 (D. Mass. 2010) (“To recover for negligent infliction
of emotional distress, plaintiff must show that a reasonable person would have suffered the same
level of emotional distress under similar circumstances.”); Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Me.,
Inc., 534 A.2d 1282, 1285 (Me. 1987); Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14, 22 (N.J. 1997).
184. Once this test is met, the Third Restatement provides that the plaintiff may then recover
for all resulting harm, even if it is unforeseeable, using the traditional “eggshell” plaintiff test of
damages. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 31 (AM. LAW INST. 2012). The Restatement also provides that the eggshell plaintiff rule
applies in cases where the defendant knows about the victim’s unusual vulnerability. Id.
185. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 120, § 15.11. This rule falls under the general law of
proximate cause, which draws a distinction between unexpected type and unexpected extent of
harm. Id.
186. See Hansen v. SkyWest Airlines, 844 F.3d 914, 926–27 (10th Cir. 2016) (describing the
use of IIED claims for sexual harassment in the workplace).
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1965); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 cmt. j. IIED claims also
require that the defendant intended to inflict severe emotional distress or acted with reckless
disregard of the likelihood of plaintiff suffering such harm. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 cmt. h.
188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46, cmt. d.
189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j.
190. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 46 cmt. j (reiterating the reasonable person standard that “the law intervenes only when
the plaintiff’s emotional harm is severe and when a person of ordinary sensitivities in the same
circumstances would suffer severe harm”); see also Sean O’Brien, The Highly Sensitive Person’s
Redress for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: Utilizing Experts in the Courtroom, 49 U.
MEM. L. REV. 533, 549 (2019) (stating that “the law remains steadfast to the standard of a
reasonable person of ordinary sensitivities” in the IIED claim).
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One of the earliest forms of a claim for hostile work environment
arose under the IIED claim. 191 When used in this context, the tort seeks
to deter and compensate for conduct that causes emotional harm for
sexual harassment in the workplace. 192
Courts have struggled with how to evaluate the severity of the
victim’s reaction under an IIED claim in this context. In Kanzler v.
Renner, 193 for example, the court compared the plaintiff’s severe
distress from workplace harassment to that of a “reasonable man,” and
found that her evidence of PTSD, anxiety, and depression was
sufficient to create a jury question on the severity of her emotional
distress. 194 Courts do not appear to have contextualized this further;
research did not reveal any specific adoption of a reasonable woman
standard to the reasonable reaction test in the IIED workplace
harassment context. 195
The flip side of the reasonable reaction test is found in the IIED
outrageousness test. With this test, the law attempts to determine
which behaviors should be considered culpable for resulting injury.
The Restatement test for outrageousness asks whether an average
191. See Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337, 1340–42, 1342 n.3 (Wyo. 1997) (discussing the
interplay between Title VII and IIED claims in the area of sexual harassment); CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION
164–74 (1979) (describing early tort actions for sexual harassment, including claims for battery,
assault, and IIED); cf. Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil
Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2127–35 (2007) (describing judicial reluctance
to use IIED to address hostile environment sexual harassment). While this article addresses the
common law claim, workplace sexual harassment can also be brought under the federal statute
that addresses sex discrimination, known as “Title VII.” Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018). The Guidelines for the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission state that workplace discrimination based on sex is prohibited. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)
(2017). Much ink has been spilled about this cause of action. The Supreme Court has found two
main types of sexual harassment under Title VII: (1) quid pro quo, and (2) hostile work
environment, in which the sexual conduct is so offensive and intimidating that it affects the
employee’s ability to perform a job. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
The claimant must prove that the environment was sufficiently hostile from both an objective and
subjective perspective. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993). An objectively
hostile work environment is one that “a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive.” Id. at
21. The Supreme Court has inched toward recognizing a more subjective, gendered perspective,
stating that this “reasonable person” should be viewed from the perspective of the reasonable
person in the plaintiff’s position. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)
(citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53,
69–70 (2006) (suggesting that the consideration of how a person in the plaintiff’s position would
respond is part of an objective standard).
192. See Hansen v. SkyWest Airlines, 844 F.3d 914, 926–27 (10th Cir. 2016).
193. Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337 (Wyo. 1997).
194. Id. at 1343–44.
195. See Robert L. Rabin, Emotional Distress in Tort Law: Themes of Constraint, 44 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1197, 1207–08 (2009).
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member of the community would find the behavior outrageous. 196 The
outrageousness test has been criticized as value-laden and vague. 197
The Restatement (Third) of Torts recognizes the difficulty of applying
the outrageousness standard, but concludes that the case law provides
sufficient guidance. 198
A few common law courts have particularized the outrage
standard in hostile work environment claims brought under IIED. In
Pavilon v. Kaferly, 199 the court found that where the defendant
continually pressured an employee for dates and offered her money for
sexual favors, the defendant’s actions created a cumulative pattern of
behavior such that “a woman of ordinary morality and sensibilities”
would perceive them to be sufficiently offensive and sinister, rising to
the level of extreme and outrageous behavior. 200 Applying the same
(outmoded) version of the reasonable woman test, the court in Pavlik
v. Kornhaber 201 found that a plaintiff stated a claim for IIED in the
employment context by alleging a campaign of sexual harassment
through the defendant’s persistent notes, sexually explicit comments,
calling of meetings to discuss his desire for sexual contact, and lewd
behavior. 202
These limiting tests—the NIED and IIED reasonable person
reaction limitation and the IIED outrageousness test—reflect the
normative view that we cannot and should not compensate for every
stress and emotional hardship inflicted by others that individuals suffer
throughout life. Tort law seeks to strike an appropriate balance

196. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“[T]he case
is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse
his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’”); see also Kanzler, 937
P.2d at 1341–42.
197. See Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of
Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 41, 51–53 (1982); Cristina Carmody Tilley, The Tort of Outrage and Some Objectivity
About Subjectivity, 12 J. TORT L. 283, 284 (2019) [hereinafter Tilley, The Tort of Outrage].
198. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 46 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2012). As the Restatement describes:
Whether an actor’s conduct is extreme and outrageous depends on the facts of each
case, including the relationship of the parties, whether the actor abused a position of
authority over the other person, whether the other person was especially vulnerable
and the actor knew of the vulnerability, the motivation of the actor, and whether the
conduct was repeated or prolonged.
Id.
199. Pavilon v. Kaferly, 561 N.E.2d 1245 (Ill. App. 1990).
200. Id. at 1251.
201. Pavlik v. Kornhaber, 761 N.E.2d 175 (Ill. App. 2001).
202. Id. at 186.
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between the right to liberty and the right to security. 203 When it comes
to emotional harm, the law favors autonomy over security when the
reaction goes beyond the value-laden reasonable reaction norm. It is
noteworthy that the reasonable or “appropriate” reaction doctrine
developed over hundreds of years during which the tools to measure
the reactions of people to stress and emotional injury were not as
accurate or developed. 204
Differences in gendered perspectives and experiences of
harassment have been documented in numerous social science
studies. 205 The studies finding sex-biased differences have concluded
that females are more likely than males to perceive certain behaviors
as harassing. 206 This difference suggests that the “truth” of the
encounter may sometimes depend on the sex of the actor. 207 Under this
view, harm affects women and men differently. 208
Neurobiology research will help inform this debate. It gives us one
more data point documenting differences in the perceptions and
processing of danger and threats. If the law takes those differences in
experience into account, how do we untangle whether these differences
in perception are biologically- or culturally-based, and should that

203. See Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 311, 360–64 (1996); Unikel, supra note 116, at 326. This stems from the basic proposition
by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke that individuals are separate and autonomous in the state of
nature and cannot exercise complete freedom of action without interfering with the rights and
interests of others. Unikel, supra note 116, at 348; see also Zipursky, supra note 115, at 2163
(“When we require people to be reasonable, we are requiring them to constrain their conduct by
reference to its potential impact on other individuals.”).
204. See Adam J. Kolber, The Experiential Future of the Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 585, 588 619,
622 (2011).
205. See Barbara A. Gutek et al., The Utility of the Reasonable Woman Legal Standard in
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Cases: A Multimethod, MultiStudy Examination, 5
PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 596, 602–04 (1999); Kerns, supra note 24, at 217.
206. Social science research suggests that women tend to see relatively more incidents and
perceive greater harm from those incidents than men because “women tend to be the victims in
sexual harassment encounters.” Barbara A. Gutek, Understanding Sexual Harassment at Work, 6
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 335, 343 (1992).
207. See CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY, supra note 176, at 315.
208. Drawing on this research, some theorists like Professor Kathryn Abrams have argued in
favor of judging workplace harassment from the perspective of a reasonable victim. See Kathryn
Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV.
1183, 1206 n.103 (1989). Abrams argues that women perceive sexual harassment differently for
several reasons, including reasons based on threats to personal safety and structural reasons such
as precarious positions in the workplace relative to men. Id. at 1205–09. The area of sexual
harassment in the workplace has received much scholarly attention. See, e.g., Ehrenreich, supra
note 150, at 1193–1201; Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 816–26 (1991).
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matter in this context? 209 For example, men and women may exhibit
different, but objectively measurable, physiological brain responses to
the perception of physical danger. Neuroscience may suggest that the
pain and emotional injury from the behavior suffered by the victim may
be physiologically different depending on whether the victim is male or
female. 210
In her path-breaking work, Professor Martha Chamallas has
examined both the NIED and IIED claims from a feminist perspective.
Under this lens, Chamallas has argued that IIED claims of hostile work
environment should move away from universal approaches to
harassment; instead they should be based on features of a person’s
identity such as race and sex. 211 She would incorporate the victim’s
perspective into determining whether actionable harm has occurred. 212
Relatedly, Professors Martha Chamallas and Jennifer Wriggins
have argued that the common law’s reluctance to compensate for
claims of NIED is not due solely to the traditional explanations of the
difficulty of measuring the harm or the fear of disproportionate
liability, but instead traces to the gender and race of the victims. 213
According to this view, tort law is less willing to recognize emotional
distress claims because these injuries were associated more with
women’s reality than men’s; the devaluation of the claim reflected
209. Papillon argues, for example, that stress, including social stress from sexual harassment,
can increase inflammation in the victim’s body and affect healing and aging. See Kimberly
Papillon, The Neuroscience and Epigenetics of Sexual Harassment: Brain Reactions, Gene
Expressions, and the Hostile Work Environment Cause of Action, 7 TENN. J. RACE, GENDER &
SOC. JUST. 1, 67–68 (2018) (indicating that harassment can make the victim more vulnerable to
physiologic and psychological injury). Professor Cristina Tilley suggests that neuroscience may
provide objective evidence as to whether the test of outrage has been sufficiently satisfied. Tilley,
The Tort of Outrage, supra note 197, at 312 (“[T]he law’s search for ‘outrageous’ behavior may
be understood as a search for scientifically maladaptive aggression.”).
210. See Papillon, supra note 209, at 61, 66–69 (describing how workplace microaggressions
“focus[ed] on gender” can lead to negative epigenetic changes for females); Lisa Molix, Sex
Differences in Cardiovascular Health: Does Sexism Influence Women’s Health?, 348 AM. J. MED.
SCI. 153, 153–54 (2014); Susan H. Berg, Everyday Sexism and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in
Women: A Correlational Study, 12 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 970, 983–84 (2006).
211. See Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil Rights to
Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2174–79 (2007).
212. Id. at 2175–79.
213. See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 173, at 185–87; Martha Chamallas, The
Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 499 (1998) [hereinafter
Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias] (“[L]egal claims for emotional distress have been devalued
in part because they are associated with female plaintiffs.”). Professor Govind Persad has noted
similar observations. See Govind Persad, Law, Science, and the Injured Mind, 67 ALA. L. REV.
1179, 1197–98 (2016) (“[S]everal commentators have complained that the disfavoring of
emotional distress torts represents an unjustified bias that is particularly disadvantageous to
female plaintiffs.”).
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women’s lower status in society. 214 Drawing on cultural feminism
theory, they argue that limiting NIED claims “reflects a masculinist
viewpoint that values pecuniary interests over intimacy . . . .” 215 As they
state, “[d]evaluation is a kind of bias that . . . affects value judgments,
such as those made about the seriousness of certain conduct or the
importance of an activity” or an injury. 216
Neuroscience studies may offer further support for this
“devaluation” argument from a physiological standpoint. 217 Beyond
cultural biases, science may eventually support this argument by
tracing average sex differences in reactions to extreme stress, trauma
and the storage of emotional memory to biological underpinnings. As
discussed earlier, studies involving the amygdala, the hippocampus, the
medial prefrontal cortex, and stress hormones suggest that there may
be specific sex-based mechanisms involved in these behaviors. 218 The
differences may explain, among other things, the higher incidence of
PTSD in women, and may suggest that women experience certain
emotional harms differently and disproportionately.
B. Recognizing Differences
If neuroscience demonstrates these differences, how should it
inform the law? Would these findings justify incorporating those
differences into the standardization of reasonably expected harm of the
inflicted stress or outrageousness of behavior? 219 On one hand, if we do
214. Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias, supra note 213, at 469. The law, under this view,
fails to attach sufficient value to “caring, nurturing, empathy, and intimate human connections[,]”
such as are recognized in NIED bystander claims. CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 173, at
25.
215. Id. at 25–26.
216. Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias, supra note 213, at 470.
217. For a fascinating review of the physiologic impact of sexual harassment in the workplace,
see generally Papillon, supra note 209 (arguing that neuroscience and epigenetics can be used to
accurately assess the victim’s injury and damages, as well as assess the brain reactions of the
onlookers—judges, jurors, witnesses, harasser, and employers—to the harassment). Because this
article focuses on man-on-woman sexual harassment, it discusses the physiologic effects of
harassment on female victims. See id. at 66–69 n.14.
218. We are already noting these differences with regard to the incidence of PTSD in males
and females. See supra notes 34–62 and accompanying text. The emerging research on stress, the
fear response, and memory processing suggest that women and men may create and retain
memories of emotional material differently, which could influence how we control learned fear
and anxiety and may account for differences in population rates of associated brain disorders like
PTSD. See id.
219. Even if courts do not use this categorical evidence to adopt a reasonable woman
standard for limited application, they still could allow expert testimony to weigh the
reasonableness of the emotional distress before ruling on a motion to dismiss or motion for
summary judgment. See Forest v. Pawtucket Police Dep’t, 290 F. Supp. 2d 215, 232 (D.R.I. 2003)
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not recognize sex-based brain differences and we hold men and women
alike to the same universalized ability to withstand different types of
emotional harm, then the law might ignore emotional harms that fail
to meet a masculine-oriented objective standard and that are suffered
disproportionately by women. This seems unfairly punitive.
On the other hand, if we apply different thresholds to emotional
harm claims, based on this science, this application could reinforce
stereotypical perceptions of female fragility and inadequacies. 220 This
may additionally lead to the unintended consequence of “blaming the
victim.” Further, if the law begins to differentiate between types of
reactions, then people may be overly cautious—and overdeterred—in
their interactions with women.
Neuroscience evidence can inform the law, but it need not control
it. Normative values cannot be divorced from how the law views
emotional harm. Even if we can empirically demonstrate distinct maleoriented or female-oriented responses to how extreme stress is
experienced and processed, the question still remains of whether the
law should reflect differentiated experiences. 221
Demonstrated average sex-based biological differences to
reactions to extreme stress may not be sufficient to overcome our
society’s ideological commitment to a single, egalitarian standard of
reasonable care. This view starts with the assumption that “promoting
equality and social justice through tort law is a legitimate enterprise.” 222
Holding men and women to the same universalized reasonable person
reaction standard has the enormous advantage of not reinforcing sex
differences and inequality. Even if neuroscience advances legitimately
challenge this assumption and quantify the disparate impact that such
a universal standard may have on women, we may not be willing to
recognize those differences in order to promote the value of a single
(recognizing the value of expert testimony to prove elements of an IIED claim at the summary
judgment phase).
220. Examples abound of stereotypical views of the female nature. Jean-Jacques Rousseau
articulated it this way: “A perfect man and a perfect woman ought no more to resemble each
other in mind than in features; . . . One must be active and strong, the other passive and weak.
One must needs have power and will, while it suffices that the other have little power of
resistance.” JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ROUSSEAU’S EMILE OR TREATISE ON EDUCATION 260
(William H. Payne trans., D. Appleton & Co. 1918) (1762).
221. See, e.g., Erica Goldberg, Emotional Duties, 47 CONN. L. REV. 809, 842 (2015) (arguing
for individual responsibility to take care of ourselves that “limits the duties others owe to avoid
distressing us”).
222. See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 173, at 190. Many scholars recognize that tort
law has an expressive function. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Expressive Function of Law, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2021–22 (1996).
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standard of care. 223 We do not want to stigmatize women as a group
that is different or inferior. 224
Another approach would be to incorporate documented
differences in emotional experience into a general reasonable person
standard. To accomplish this, the court would instruct the jury that in
applying the reasonable person standard, it is permissible to take into
account average sex-based differences in emotional injury perception
and experience. 225 This would avoid a formal, bifurcated standard. Of
course, assuming our standards have evolved to a sort of hypermasculine “reasonable person,” in which individuals are expected to
assume the risk of most severe emotional harms, society could benefit
from adjusting the reasonable person standard in this way (as an
alternative to having varying standards based on sex, or only malebased standards). The law would adjust to include the deterrent force
of possible liability based on the science about harms to women from
severe stress and emotional injury. 226
If we move beyond the normative value of equality in law strongly
promoted by liberal feminist legal theory and accept that the due care
standard for emotional harm should selectively recognize a bifurcated
reasonableness standard, we need to be extremely cautious in
determining when to proceed. This is complicated territory. This
question assumes that it is even possible to untangle how biology
influences individuals from the reinforcement of cultural stereotypes,

223. See Schlanger, supra note 147, at 139 (describing how courts have “refused to hold
women to a norm of timidity”).
224. Professor Mayo Moran, in examining some areas of criminal law where the reasonable
person standard is used (such as self-defense, provocation, and sexual assault), ultimately
concluded that subjectivizing the standard will not enhance equality. MORAN, supra note 111, at
202–31. Instead, she found that subjectivizing the standard in those contexts would enable
perpetrators to invoke discriminatory stereotypes, which may leave judges with simple questions
of credibility. As she stated, “[t]he more widely held such beliefs, the more credible they will be.”
Id. at 230 (“Subjectivizing the standard, far from promoting equality, simply seems to give more
unfettered play to the very beliefs that are most likely to undermine equality.”).
225. Admissibility of evidence and other evidentiary questions are beyond the scope of this
Article. See supra notes 112–114 and accompanying text.
226. An example of this line of thinking arises in lawsuits challenging paternity leave policies
that differ for men and women. See, e.g., Savignac v. Jones Day, No. 1:19-cv-02443-RDM, 2020
WL 5291980, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2019) (describing plaintiff’s argument that men should be
given the same paternity leave as women); see also Barbara Y. Welke, Unreasonable Women:
Gender and the Law of Accidental Injury, 1870–1920, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 370, 372 (1994)
(arguing that gender shaped the development of negligence law, and legal precedents that initially
favored women became available to men as well). As Professor Barbara Welke pointed out, “[a]ll
passengers of railroads, for example, benefitted from the longer stops required for ladies to
alight.” Id.

2020]

SEX-BASED BRAIN DIFFERENCES

69

which may not be attainable. 227 Causal issues may also simply be too
difficult to unpack. 228 The significance of the evidence may not be
clear, 229 and the magnitude of the differences may not be great. 230 We
227. In the context of antidiscrimination law, Professor Katherine Franke argues:
almost every claim with regard to sexual identity or sex discrimination can be shown to
be grounded in normative gender rules and roles. Herein lies the mistake. . . . [S]exual
equality jurisprudence has uncritically accepted the validity of biological sexual
differences. By accepting these biological differences, equality jurisprudence reifies as
foundational fact that which is really an effect of normative gender ideology. . . . In
many cases, biology operates as the excuse or cover for social practices that hierarchize
individual members of the social category ‘man’ over individual members of the social
category ‘woman.’
Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex
from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1995); see also Sherrine M. Walker & Christopher D.
Wall, Feminist Jurisprudence: Justice and Care, 11 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 255, 281 (1997) (“To listen to
this feminine voice . . . would be to compound the effects of age-old male domination and reaffirm
the male-induced . . . roles adopted by women.”).
228. For example, societal influences like poverty and crime could also account for
differences in perception and reaction to emotional harm. See Tama Leventhal & Jeanne BrooksGunn, Moving to Opportunity: An Experimental Study of Neighborhood Effects on Mental Health,
93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1576, 1576 (2003) (finding that a policy that moved families out of highpoverty areas had a positive effect on mental health); Amber L. Pearson & Gregory D. Breetzke,
The Association Between the Fear of Crime, and Mental and Physical Wellbeing in New Zealand,
119 SOC. INDICATORS RSCH. 281, 289 (2014) (discussing the relationship between fear of crime
and “certain physiological changes and unhealthy behavior patterns”); Kevin M. Simon, Michaela
Beder & Marc W. Manseau, Addressing Poverty and Mental Illness, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (June
28, 2018), https://www.psychiatrictimes.com/special-reports/addressing-poverty-and-mentalillness [https://perma.cc/77XC-N48T].
229. Use of social framework evidence remains controversial. See Melissa Hart & Paul M.
Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social Framework Evidence in Employment Discrimination Class
Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 41–44 (2009) (describing the use of social framework evidence
in matters such as reliability of eyewitness identification, the battered woman’s syndrome, and
employment discrimination).
One unanswered question is whether—and at what point—average differences may be
used in law and policy decision-making. Average differences may be used to disadvantage women
as a class, or to disadvantage individual women who are not “average.” For example, if science
shows that women on average are more vulnerable to PTSD than men due in large part to
differences in brain structure and function, could women be removed from combat duties?
Though such a decision would surely be “because of sex,” would the military be able to raise a
defense that this is a bona fide occupation qualification (“BFOQ”)? How much greater would the
risk have to be to qualify as a BFOQ? Should an individual woman be given the opportunity to
argue that the policy is not applicable to her given her individual resiliency?
Normative views would also come into play in addressing this question. Professor
Catharine MacKinnon argues that the essence of unlawful unequal treatment is not difference—
men are just as different from women as women are from men—but a socially-imposed hierarchy.
See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Equality, 149 DAEDULUS 213, 213–15 (2020) (arguing for
“substantive equality”). In other words, the consequences of the difference are socially
determined. Under this view, women should not be deprived of the opportunity to serve in
combat and may accept the potential for the greater risk of PTSD, as men also have the potential
to suffer from PTSD in combat and have been given the opportunity to assume that risk.
230. See Gary T. Schwartz, Feminist Approaches to Tort Law, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
175, 189 (2001).
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do not want to view women as a monolithic group that universally
shares certain essential experiences. 231
A danger of using neuroscience studies to reflect average
differences is that this approach may open the door to individualized
standards, under which a person with a particular diagnosis or cultural
background is more or less culpable for various activities. This would
undermine a primary goal in tort law of deterring certain behaviors in
everyone, regardless of ability or background: we do not want the
intellectually disabled to maintain their property in ways that could
prove dangerous to their neighbor nor do we want inexperienced or
ignorant drivers to ignore their failing brakes. This argues in favor of
broader, sex-neutral standards of care in most situations. 232 Once we
recognize further individualization of the victim’s reactions to
emotional harm, this realization argues in favor of individualizing
characteristics of the tortfeasor as well. 233
231. See supra notes 176–177 and accompanying text.
232. Neuroscience studies finding sex-based brain differences may have implications for
other areas of tort law. For example, informed consent in the medical treatment context relies on
the application of the reasonable person standard. Although the standard originally relied on the
“professional” rule to determine what information on risks a medical provider needed to disclose
to gain informed consent, this test has been replaced by the now-favored “patient” rule, which
demands that the patient be offered information material to a reasonable person’s informed
decision. See, e.g., Matthies v. Mastromonaco, 733 A.2d 456, 461–62 (N.J. 1999). The normative
value underlying the test is that of individual autonomy: the patient, not the medical provider,
should make the life decision about whether to undergo a particular procedure. See id. at 460. We
rely on the objective reasonable person test—rather than what this particular patient would want
to know—because of the complicated issue of causation. The patient would almost certainly
testify (and believe) that she wanted full disclosure of all risks and would not have proceeded with
the treatment if she had received it. Thus, the objective patient rule theoretically avoids the
problem of bias and idiosyncrasy on the part of the patient. It also offers ease of administration:
application of an individualized standard would eliminate any standard altogether. But if science
can show that women and men, on average, process bodily risks differently in given situations,
this would suggest that a sex-based standard is not too idiosyncratic or individualized. Instead the
standard could recognize broad group differences in reactions. A blended standard of informed
consent could govern a sex-based view of autonomy and bodily integrity. Cf. Chamallas, Feminist
Legal Theory and Tort Law, supra note 111, at 395–96 (drawing an analogy from the medicalbased informed consent doctrine to outline sufficient consent in sexual assault tort claims, which
would require defendants to obtain a sexual partner’s affirmative permission to proceed or face
liability). Similarly, the standard of care for treatment of brain disorders would now necessarily
take into account whether the patient is male or female. For example, female athletes may be
more likely to suffer concussion injury than male athletes during their career, which may be
related to brain physiology differences. Tatyana Mollayeva, Graziella El-Khechen-Richandi &
Angela Colantonio, Sex & Gender Considerations in Concussion Research, 3 CONCUSSION 1, 2
(2018); Randy Dotinga, Concussions More Likely in Female Athletes, WEBMD (Feb. 28, 2017),
https://www.webmd.com/brain/news/20170228/concussions-more-likely-in-female-athletes
[https://perma.cc/RUA8-E7LL].
233. Although the law does not individualize reactions to extreme stress when these reactions
are used as part of an element of duty or breach, the law individualizes injuries for damages under
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Furthermore, the problems of administrability may be too
complex. 234 On one hand, we do not want a standard that is too fluid
with each new scientific advance—it would be counterproductive to
retool constantly what it means to be “reasonable.” Recognizing
differences could defeat the critical function of law to provide notice of
standards of care. 235 Nor should the law create a standard solely for the
benefit of women. 236 On the other hand, one benefit of the reasonable
person standard is that theoretically we can adjust it periodically,
reflecting significant changes in cultural attitudes, community values,
and societal expectations of risk and safety. 237 Substantial scientific
advances may justify an adjustment to that standard.
Additionally, we typically rely on judges and jurors to make these
adjustments, 238 but the views of those decision-makers may be subject
to bias as well. Neuroscience may eventually enable us to make our
community standards of a reasonable reaction more objective for men
and women, without relying on the subjective view of a jury of twelve
or fewer people. This evidence could possibly allow us to determine
general standards of reasonableness for men and women in certain

the eggshell plaintiff rule. Once the tortfeasor is found to have breached his duty of due care in a
way that caused injury, the law holds the tortfeasor responsible for all injuries, even unusual or
idiosyncratic ones. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 120, § 15.11.
234. Assuming the concept of a reasonable woman’s standard gains judicial acceptance,
courts and litigants will need to work out various practical issues in applying the standard. Will
application of the standard be case-specific, requiring the plaintiff to present expert and other
proof that the standard is appropriate in her particular case? What evidence will the defendant
be permitted to introduce to challenge use of the standard? Will these admissibility issues be
handled outside the jury’s presence? See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 104. How should the jury be
instructed? For example, will the jury be instructed to apply a reasonable woman’s standard to
certain elements of emotional harm claims, or will they be instructed that they may consider sexbased brain differences when applying a reasonable person standard? These and other issues will
all need to be considered, although they are beyond the scope of this Article.
235. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 120, § 10.11.
236. Defendants could conceivably raise equal protection challenges to the use of a
reasonable woman standard, claiming that the standard does not survive intermediate scrutiny.
See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682–83 (1973). While future scholarship may
address this constitutional question, we can presume the same scientific evidence that shows sexbased distinctions in emotional distress responses would also be used to meet any constitutional
challenge.
237. See Cristina Carmody Tilley, Tort Law Inside Out, 126 YALE L.J. 1320, 1356, 1364
(2017).
238. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 120, § 10.12; Calnan, supra note 116, at 15 (“[L]aw’s
longstanding norms are constantly mediated by judges and juries informed by prevailing social
values.”); Welke, supra note 226, at 386 (explaining that an explicitly bifurcated standard of due
care for men and women did not develop historically because jurors implicitly assumed that jury
instructions on reasonableness reflected different community expectations of reasonable
behavior for men and women).
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limited areas like severe emotional harm, informing a normative
judgment of a reasonable reaction. This would help determine the
limits of duty—if there are objective average differences in reactions
to severe emotional harm, that evidence can help delineate the
contours of the duty. 239 In broadening the standard of care to include
both women’s and men’s perspective of reasonableness, we certainly
do not want to simply incorporate female stereotypes along with male
stereotypes into the standard. This approach would not advance
gender equality. 240
CONCLUSION
Women are different from men in some ways, but these
differences do not reflect deficiencies or weaknesses. When law
accounts for differences correctly, this approach should reinforce the
law’s core values of neutrality and equal treatment, while recognizing
the implications of important empirical differences. The increased
ability to quantify sex-based brain differences in experiencing and
processing emotional harm should force courts and legislatures to
rethink whether a single reasonable person standard suffices in every
instance. We need to make sure the differences are real and significant.
An indivisible view of reasonable women potentially could minimize
their commonalities with men. This view also has the danger of
ignoring the differences among women. At the same time, we use an
empirically informed standard of reasonableness in many contexts;
these discoveries would provide us with one more data point to use,
though the data would not be determinative. It simply supports an
argument to recalibrate a reasonableness standard informed by

239. See Miller & Perry, supra note 122, at 367–68 (“[A]ny rule needs some content—at a
minimum, some general guidelines that will enable courts to adjudicate nonarbitrarily and allow
potential injurers and victims to prepare for contingencies.”).
240. It is critical to enter this discussion cautiously. For example, could neuroscience research
support an argument that there are sex-specific differences in cognitive abilities that implicate
workplace discrimination claims? This issue, once addressed by Dr. Larry Summers to much
controversy, see Scott Jaschik, What Larry Summers Said, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 18, 2005),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2005/02/18/what-larry-summers-said
[https://perma.cc/PQP4-H3QK], resurfaced in the lawsuit brought by James Damore, a former
Google software engineer. When Google fired Damore, he filed a lawsuit claiming that Google
discriminates against white men with conservative views. He argued that inherent biological
differences and not the lack of opportunity or prejudice explained the shortage of women in
leadership and technical positions in the tech industry. Louise Matsakis, Labor Board Rules
Google’s Firing of James Damore Was Legal, WIRED (Feb. 16, 2018, 6:31 PM),
https://www.wired.com/story/labor-board-rules-google-firing-james-damore-was-legal
[https://perma.cc/HZ6A-5SY7].
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objective phenomena in processing emotional harm in certain limited
circumstances.
As Professors Martha Chamallas and Linda Kerber remarked in
the context of fright-based claims,
[t]hat recognizing difference may lead to marginalization, while
ignoring difference may lead to inequitable results, has long been the
Scylla and Charybdis of feminist theory. A major goal of feminist
theory is to find a route past these monsters: first, by being skeptical
of conceptual dualisms enshrined in familiar cultural and legal
practice, and second, by unmasking claims of difference to reveal
unstated norms against which difference is judged. 241

Neuroscience may help us find that route.
This exploratory Article raises more questions than it answers.
The science on sex-based brain differences is nascent and the legal
implications myriad. Although we need to proceed cautiously, we
should not fear this line of research. Understanding human behavior is
a critical enterprise and noble goal. 242 This is the time to begin the
conversation about implications in tort law from sex-based brain
differences.

241. Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A
History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 863 (1990).
242. See ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, THE STRANGE ORDER OF THINGS: LIFE, FEELINGS, AND
THE MAKING OF CULTURES 171, 243 (2018). As Professor Antonio Damasio has stated, “It is
often feared that greater knowledge of biology reduces complex, minded, and willful cultural life
to automated, pre-mental life[,]” but instead, advances in science “achieve[] something
spectacularly different: a deepening of the connection between cultures and the life process[,]”
and thus “reinforce[] the humanist project.” Id.

